Meet & Confer at 10 Paces

There are attorneys who believe the most effective Rule 26(f) meet and confer is simply meeting at dawn with dueling pistols.

The parties in Procongps, Inc. v. Skypatrol, LLC, fought over proclaimed inadequate productions, failures to adequately meet and confer and the defensibility of their productions. Procongps, Inc. v. Skypatrol, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47133, 9-12 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013).

The parties Spireon and Skypatrol had many dueling “they did/they did that first” claims before the Court.

Spireon took issue with a discovery production of “410,000 pages of documents” that contained duplicated information. Procongps, Inc., at *8.

According to Spireon, Skypatrol proposed discussing limiting the scope of ESI in the case. According to Spireon, they were willing to “discuss a search of a limited number of custodians using identified terms only after Skypatrol produced documents that could be identified through traditional methods of conferring with Skypatrol’s employees and agents to identify and produce responsive documents.” Procongps, Inc., at *7.

The parties exchanged discussions about discussing search terms, provided that Skypatrol first met is obligation to produce responsive discovery. Procongps, Inc., at *7-8. Skypatrol’s production followed after these exchanges. Spireon then sought an order from the Court for Skypatrol to identify its production by category pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(E)(i). Procongps, Inc., at *8.

Skypatrol claimed that they had requested to meet and confer over search terms for months. According to Skypatrol, Spireon refused to meet to discuss discovery productions and exchange search terms. Procongps, Inc., at *8.

Skypatrol argued, “Spireon insisted that Skypatrol conduct its own searches and produce documents from over 200 GB of data.” Procongps, Inc., at *8.

Skypatrol claimed that Spireon could not both refuse to cooperate over limiting the scope of discovery through cooperation, then claim Skypatrol produced “too many” documents. Procongps, Inc., at *8-9.

Furthermore, Skypatrol explained that they did run a de-duplication process over its production; the “duplicative” files were email attachments to messages they included for a complete production. Procongps, Inc., at *9-10.

Skypatrol also argued that Spireon’s production was not forensically sound (defensible), because 1) Spireon could not identify any custodians from whom ESI has been collected; 2) Any search terms used to identify responsive ESI other than “Skypatrol;” and 3) The volume of ESI that had been collected or produced by another in the litigation. Procongps, Inc., at *10-11.

After the parties finished taking their respective shots at the other, the Court stated the following:

Based upon the record before the Court, it appears that the parties have not engaged in a meaningful meet and confer process with regard to ESI production. It is the Court’s view that the current document issues could have been avoided if the parties had cooperated with each other. The relief that the parties seek is essentially an order directing the other side to comply with their discovery obligations, and the Court believes such an order would not actually remedy any problems because both parties assert that they have and are fully complying with their discovery obligations. The Court finds that the most efficient solution is for counsel who are responsible for ESI production to engage in an in-person meet and confer regarding all outstanding ESI production issues in an effort to resolve those matters. If the meet and confer is unsuccessful, the Court will refer any disputes regarding ESI production to a Magistrate Judge for resolution.

Procongps, Inc., at *11-12.

Bow Tie Thoughts 

The Dreyfus Protocol should never be included in a meet and confer.

eDiscovery requires attorneys to not simply talk about cooperating, but to actually cooperate. Determining search methodologies, the scope of discovery and production formats do not require the same zeal as cross-examining an adverse witness. It is not supposed to be a game of “gotcha,” but determining the technical framework to get to the merits of the case. This requires attorneys to be tactical and have a strategic vision for how they will handle ESI in their cases. Moreover, parties must engage in more than pillow talk to actually reach agreement on eDiscovery protocols.

The adult supervision in eDiscovery often comes from eDiscovery attorneys in law firms and litigation support professionals. How data is collected, the scope of ESI in the lawsuit, data reduction strategies and review methodologies are vital to litigating a case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 1. Fundamentally, these are the professionals who advise attorneys to not request “any and all” ESI, but “all unique ESI” to limit duplicate data in ESI productions. The value of these professionals cannot be overstated in helping litigators be cost efficient and effective.

Attorneys who want to learn effective eDiscovery strategy should read Michael Arkfeld’s Best Practices Guide for ESI Pretrial Discovery: Strategy & Tactics. It is one of the best books on the subject. In full disclosure, Michael is a good friend and I have helped on many webinars. The book offers a great overview of issues, checklists and discovery strategies every litigator should before a meet & confer.

Clawback Agreements to Eliminate the Burden of Privilege Review

I am gonna to hit the brakes, he’ll fly right by me.

Maverick, Top Gun

You’re gonna do what?

Merlin, Top Gun

 

Attorneys feel compelled by their duty of competency to their clients to have eyes on every document that might be privileged.

Given cases such as J-M Manufacturing it is easy to see why attorneys are concerned about privilege review in large document review cases.

If an associate attorney were to tell a partner she could rely on a clawback agreement and not conduct privilege review, it is a safe bet the partner would respond as Merlin did to Maverick in Top Gun.

In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc. v. This Document Relates involves issued of undue burden in producing electronically stored information. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff’s proposed search terms produced “hits” of nearly 200,000. The Defendants claimed the estimated cost to process, host and review the data for responsiveness and privilege was approximately $388,000. In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc. v. This Document Relates, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39050, at *14 (D. Md. Mar. 21, 2013). Accordingly, the Defendants sought relief under the proportionality principles of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).

The parties to their credit had negotiated over search terms to ease the burden on the Defendants (and ultimately themselves in what the Plaintiffs would have to review).

The Court made what some would consider a surprising statement: [A] clawback order can protect Defendants against a claim of waiver, such that Defendants need no longer bear the cost of reviewing the ESI for responsiveness and privilege. In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc., at *16. As such, the Defendants failed to show undue burden in producing electronically stored information.

The Court’s ruling is not the first time such an order was given. As stated in footnote 6, former Magistrate Judge (now District Court Judge) Paul Grimm found that “the more practical approach is to avoid the necessity of an expensive and time-consuming privilege review by entry of a court order with a clawback provision that protects against a claim of waiver by production of a privileged document.” In re Coventry Healthcare, Inc., at 14-15, fn 6, citing Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005).

The Court granted the Plaintiff’s motion to compel and invited the Defendants to confer with the Plaintiffs on a clawback order if they wanted one.

Bow Tie Thoughts

There are several thought leaders who have argued that the cost of privilege review can be eliminated with protective orders and clawback agreements. While having both is definitely a good idea, many attorneys feel terrified at not conducting some sort of privilege review.

One option to privilege review is to leverage technology-assisted review in identifying potentially privileged ESI. I would still always recommend a clawback agreement and potentially a protective order, depending on the subject matter of the ESI. However, TAR such as predictive coding could be used to identify potentially privileged material. Generally speaking, many attorneys have an idea what sort of communications or files will be protected by a privilege. Leveraging technology to identify attorney-client communications, intellectual property, or personal identifiable information can enable the data to be organized based on both privilege and responsiveness. This allows the attorneys to review data that is potentially privilege, if they are so inclined to have eyes on such ESI.

Relevance, Social Media & Personal Computers

In an employment dispute, the Defendant sought access to the Plaintiff’s Facebook profile and personal computer. The case had involved several discovery disputes challenging the Plaintiff’s discovery productions. Potts v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38795, 5-9 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2013).

Among the discovery requests, the Defendant requested “Facebook and/or other social media data” and “Any computers or digital storage devices used by either Plaintiff during and after her employment with Defendant.” Potts, at *3.

The Plaintiff explained they had produced her day planner, documentation of “write-ups” and “store visits” from her employment and all emails relevant to the case. Potts, at *3-4.

The Plaintiff challenged the request for full access to the Facebook profile, arguing that the Defendants had failed to make a “threshold showing that publicly available information on [Facebook] undermines the Plaintiff’s claims.” Potts, at *4-5, citing Thompson v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85143, 2012 WL 2342928, *4 (D. Nev. June 20, 2012).

The Plaintiff also objected to the request for the computer as unduly burdensome, because she had “produced” the relevant information from the computer. Potts, at *4.

The Court held that that Defendants did not make a showing that the Plaintiff’s public Facebook profile contained information that would reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Potts, at *7. The Court based its findings on the Plaintiff’s discovery productions and case law. Id. The Court cited the following in their decision:

[M]aterial posted on a ‘private Facebook page, that is accessible to a selected group of recipients but not available for viewing by the general public, is generally not privileged, nor is it protected by common law or civil law notions of privacy. Nevertheless, the Defendant does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public view. Rather, consistent with Rule 26(b) . . . [and decisional law] . . . there must be a threshold showing that the requested information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Otherwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engaged in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff’s Facebook account.

Potts, at *6-7, citing Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D. Mich. 2012).

However, the personal computer was another story.

The Court agreed the physical production of the computer could lead to admissible evidence, however the parties were ordered to “agree to a word search of Plaintiff’s computer by an agreed neutral party.” Potts, at *8.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Discovery requests are a mix of art and science. Drafting requests requires an attorney to consider the possible sources of ESI, analyze the case facts and draft the reasonably tailored request for discovery. This is easier said than done.

Attorneys really need to be thoughtful in drafting requests for electronically stored information on social media. Done too broadly, it can be the moral equivalent of demanding an MRI in a breach of contract case. At the end of the day, the requests must be for relevant ESI.

Personal computers are another story. A requesting part simply does not get to forage for evidence through someone’s computer. Courts put safeguards in place to avoid privacy from being invaded, such as neutral examiners and the opportunity for privilege review before production.

A good practice is to image a personal computer after a triggering event to preserve any possible relevant information. Costs for such imaging have come down considerably, ranging between $300 to $500 for service providers. This is a very worthy investment compared to the costs of motion practice or defending spoliation claims. Analysis of the contents, searching and processing will drive the cost up; however, talk with the service provider on how they charge for these services. It might be hourly or a flat rate.

Rule 34 and TIFF Productions in the Clouds

German v. Micro Elecs., iNC., is an employment case that involved discovery disputes centering on the Plaintiff’s mitigation of damages, including among other issues, the Plaintiff’s calendars and online activity, including blogging and records-keeping.

The Plaintiff’s attorney claimed the Plaintiff had hardship in responding, because she could not afford to make copies, and her “advancing carpal tunnel [made] it increasingly difficult for her to do anything with her hands or writs, including the clicking of a touchpad on a [laptop], and even the advancing of a screen on her iPad.” German v. Micro Elecs., iNC., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4594 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2013).

The Plaintiff produced information she had copied from blogs and websites, which were then pasted into an email and printed by her attorney. The production was over 100 printed pages. The Court also noted that this production did not accurately identify the source of the text. German, at *18.

The Defendants considered the production deficient, because “it was not guaranteed to capture the original and complete text, formatting, and images of a blog or website.” The Defendants suggested production as PDF’s copies or a production format that was “reviewable and captures the documents in their original format.” German, at *18-19.

The Plaintiff claimed production as PDF screenshots was unduly burdensome and was not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the blog posts and other ESI were “ordinarily maintained” on external servers within multi-tiered web pages. As such, creating PDF’s would be time and cost-intensive, in addition to not being the form they were ordinarily maintained. German, at *19-20.

The Court found the Plaintiff’s claim the production complied with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) to be “disingenuous,” because “It [was] beyond dispute that the one-hundred-page email document with copied and pasted excerpts from blog and website postings is not in the form “in which it is ordinarily maintained.’” German, at *23, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).

The Court also explained the production was not ”in a reasonably usable form,” because the production stripped “the entries of their original and complete text, formatting, images, and likely the source.” Id.

The Court noted N.D. Ohio L.R. App. K, Default Standard for Discovery of Electronically Stored Info. (“E-Discovery”), Standard 6, which states an “acceptable” default production format is a static image, not native format with accompanying metadata. German, at *23-24, citing In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D. Ohio 2012). (The Court noted that the ESI and metadata needed to be preserved and could be produced if there is a particularized need. German, at *24.)

The Court held the Plaintiff should have produced the online content as static images, because no form of production had been stated by the Defendants. Id.

Bow Tie Thoughts

The Court’s statement regarding N.D. Ohio L.R. App. K, Default Standard for Discovery of Electronically Stored Info. (“E-Discovery”), Standard 6, that static images are a default when no form of production is stated, seems to go against the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a volumes of case law, which state the searchable features of native files cannot be degraded in a discovery production. Moreover, the Court in Porsche stated, “This Court has expressed a preference for the production of electronically stored information in its native format.” In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D. Ohio 2012).

Granted, static images can be an accepted form of production, as long as the production includes extracted text and the metadata needed for the production to be searchable. TIFF’s, by their very nature, are not searchable. PDF may or may not be, depending on whether it is a searchable PDF. As such, the danger of a “static image” production is it would be as searchable as a paper production, except there are no boxes of paper to keep in a repository.

Producing ESI as static images can also dramatically increase processing costs in converting searchable native files into non-searchable static images.

However, this case was not the “standard” discovery dispute of email from Outlook or Excel files, but online content. These types of cases battling over the production of online content will become the “new normal,” given the use of webmail, social media and the vast use of smartphones and tablets to create content with remote computing systems.

It is very understandable that attorneys may not know how to have this information captured after a decade of case law focused on native files, metadata or maintaining the parent-child relationship between email and attachments.

“Cloud discovery” calls for a collection expert knowledgeable in “cloud” collections, who can develop the most cost and time effective means to capture responsive discovery in a legally defensible manner. It is also entirely possible, depending on the case, that searchable PDF’s would be a reasonably useable form for a cloud discovery production.

There are many tools available to collect cloud discovery, from HTTrack to X1 Discovery to Nextpoint, depending on the nature of the online content. There are many other options as well, which would likely all be cheaper than motion practice over the form of production.

Always Explain “Why” to the Judge

A Plaintiff brought a motion to compel “access to electronic records,” claiming the Defendants had “withheld electronically stored information” and had not produced a “chronological e-mail history of any kind.” Murray v. Coleman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130219, 1-3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012).

The Defense attorney claimed that the Defendant had produced “copies (free of charge) of the documents sought,” thus rendering the Plaintiff’s motion “moot.” Murray, at *2.

The Plaintiff countered that, “virtually no electronic records [were] included” in the discovery production.  Id. Moreover, the Plaintiff claimed there was never a “systemic search” of the Defendant’s databases and that he “has not received any chronological electronic records related specifically to a single Defendant and/or electronic communications concerning extensive claims” in the case. Murray, at *2-3.

Magistrate Judge Jonathan W. Feldman stated the Defense attorney’s “terse response” made it difficult to determine whether the Defendants had produced all the responsive email to the Plaintiff’s request for production. Murray, at *3. Moreover, the Court noted that the Defense Declaration had “not provide any details regarding how and where electronically stored information (“ESI”) is held, what efforts were made to preserve relevant ESI, and the method used by defendants to locate, search and produce relevant ESI.” Murray, at *3.

The Court referred to the “inadequacy” of the Defense response to the motion to compel and thus construed the response effectively argued that the electronically stored information was not produced because it was not “reasonably accessible.”  Murray, at *3.

In situations where a party resists the production of ESI, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(2)(B) requires that “the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”

Case law also requires responding parties to demonstrate how ESI is not reasonably accessible as follows:

[I]dentify, by category or type, the sources containing potentially responsive information that it is neither searching nor producing. The identification should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.

Murray, at *3-4, citing Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Global Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 350, 358-59 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).

The Court ordered the Defendants to comply with Rule 26(b)(2)(B) by filing an affidavit by a person with direct knowledge of the Defendant’s document and email retention system stating:

 (1) The document/email retention policy used by DOCS currently and during the relevant time periods;

(2) The dates of emails “reasonably accessible” for production in this litigation;

(3) The back up or legacy system, if any, used by DOCS to preserve or archive emails that are no longer “reasonably accessible” and whether responsive documents or data may potentially be found on such back up or legacy systems;

(4) Whether accessing archived or back up emails would be unduly burdensome or costly and why; and

(5) The date when a litigation hold or document preservation notice was put in place by DOCS regarding this matter and either a copy of or a description of the preservation or litigation hold utilized by DOCS.

Murray, at *4-5.

Bow Tie Thoughts

I have met Federal and state court judges across the country with one unifying factor on ESI productions: they want to know what was done to find responsive electronically stored information. Gone are the days of lawyers merely telling a judge, “Your Honor, finding email is unduly burdensome and expensive.” Such statements need to be support with specific facts, not empty rhetoric.

Judges are heavily armed with a one word question when an attorney claims ESI is not reasonably accessible: Why?

Magistrate Judge Jonathan W. Feldman outlined excellent points that a party likely would have to answer in many cases. While cases obviously can vary, other possible factors to consider include:

Search methodology required to identify ESI;

Type of electronically stored information;

Technology required to render the ESI into a “reasonably accessible”;

Time required to performance the relevant work;

Cost estimate for process or translate the ESI into a reasonably useable form;

Review cost estimate

This is by no means an all-inclusive list. A person with eDiscovery knowledge can determine what is enough detail to enable a requesting party (and Court) to evaluate the burdens and costs of producing the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive ESI under the facts of a given case.

You Do Have to Look for Discovery in Your Possession

A Producing Party (the Defendant) argued against searching for responsive electronically stored information, claiming “that the mere fact an employee might have discoverable information or relevant knowledge does not necessarily mean she possesses relevant documents.” McNearney v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108386, 14-16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2012).

Negative inductive reasoning aside, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34 requires a party “to produce requested documents if they are within his ‘possession, custody, or control.’” McNearney, at *14, citing Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 165 n.6 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Producing Party did not challenge that it failed to search for responsive electronically stored information from “numerous employees identified as likely having discoverable [information],” but took the position that just because it was possible the custodians had relevant information, did not mean they actually had the relevant information.  McNearney, at *14.

The Court agreed with the logic, but that did not give the Producing Party a free pass on its duty to make a reasonable inquiry, especially considering the fact the Producing Party identified the employee as likely having relevant information. Id.

Further causing problems for the production, was a difference in email messages produced by the Defendant and two other Defense custodians, suggesting that there had not been a reasonable search for email by one of the Defense custodians. McNearney, at *14-15.

The Producing Party also conceded that it did not produce email attachments and that its search scope was narrower than the Plaintiff’s discovery requests. McNearney, at *15.

The Court held the following on the Defendant’s search:

Defendant’s production of some documents in response to RFP No. 5 does not satisfy its duty to make a reasonable search for and produce all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control. Despite its original objection that RFP No. 5 was unduly burdensome because it was “a trap for Defendants,” DOC has not demonstrated that conducting a thorough search for responsive ESI would pose an undue burden or cost, as required in responding to a motion to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

McNearney, at *15-16 (Emphasis added).

Bow Tie Thoughts

A party must demonstrate undue burden to limit discovery. This does not include an argument “that just because there might be something relevant, does not mean there is something relevant.”  While that is true in a logical discussion during a philosophy class, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not an exercise in metaphysical nihilism to circumvent a party’s duty to conduct a reasonable search for responsive ESI to a discovery request.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require ESI to be produced as it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably useable form. By the plain language of “ordinarily maintained,” a producing party cannot break the parent-child relationship between email messages and their attachments (or Tweets and Hyperlinks or text messages with photos).  Additionally, a production that breaks the parent-child relationship is not in a “reasonably useable form,” since searching for an attachment to its corresponding message is like re-unitizing a document that has had its staples removed and the pages shuffled with 1,000 other pages.

The technology to collect, search and produce electronically stored information are well established now after a decade of being available. These products are common services offered by eDiscovery service providers and many law firms have brought these technologies in house. While electronic discovery has many challenges, there are solutions available to these challenges that are affordable.

Discovery from 3rd Party Vendors

A company outsourcing payroll, human resources and other business services to third parties is standard operating procedure today.  However, what happens when there are discovery requests for a party’s business information hosted by a third-party?

Such discovery requests caused a court to play butcher to carve out the discovery obligations of the parties and third-party vendors in Bush v. Ruth’s Chris Steak House, Inc.

Bush v. Ruth’s Chris Steak House, Inc., is an employment dispute. The first dispute with third-party discovery involved the Defendant’s applicant tracking database. The Defendant did not produce the information, because their third-party vendor maintained it. Bush v. Ruth’s Chris Steak House, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86351, at *10 (D.D.C. June 18, 2012).

The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants needed to produce and bear the costs of production, because the information was under the Defendant’s custody and control. Id.

The Defendant countered that they did not have “possession” of the applications and that they did “not have control because they have neither possession of the documents nor an employment relationship with the third party vendors, such that Defendants would have a legal right to obtain the documents at issue ‘on demand.’” Id.

As such, the Defendant took the position the Plaintiffs needed to either 1) pay for the production or 2) do a Rule 45 request to the third-party. Bush, at *10-11.

The key issue was whether the Defendant had “control” of the requested discovery.

Case law states the following on “control”:

Control does not require that the party have legal ownership or actual physical possession of the documents at issue, but rather “the right, authority or practical ability to obtain the documents from a non-party to the action.”

Bush, at *11.

The Court did not spend a much time carving up the issue of control, finding it would require a large investment of judicial resources to determine if the Defendant actually controlled its vendor. As such, the cost of $500 for producing the information was to be divided between the parties. Bush, at *12-13.

The other discovery at issue were the employee tests that allegedly were the barriers for advancement for the female employees. Bush, at *13.

A third-party maintained the tests and scores. The third-party stated retrieving the test data would take 40 or more hours. The cost was $150 an hour for the work (so at least $6,000). Id.

The Defendant also maintained the tests in the personnel files, but refused to compile the records, arguing that a prior Court Order stated they were not required to “compile results from review of employee records.”  Id.

The Court was blunt: “The test data sought is in Defendants’ possession, and therefore must be disclosed under Rule 34.”  Id.

The Court explained the prior Order applied to human resource data, not test records. Moreover, the issue of test data was discussed in another area of the Court Order and was not excluded from production. Bush, at *13-14.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Companies use third-party vendors extensively in modern business. Courts will not likely tolerate producing parties using those relationships as a shield from production. Courts will either focus on whether the producing party had “control” of their data; order the producing party to bear the production costs; split the costs between the parties; or require a third-party request in some situations.

My instincts tell me it will likely be the producing party who has to take the laboring oar in ordering the production of data hosted by a third-party vendor. It is very easy for information hosted by a third-party to fall under the Stored Communication Act or other privacy laws regulating hosted data. Moreover, a Rule 34 request can force the producing party to consent to disclosure under the Store Communication Act in order to respond to the request, opposed to requiring the third-party to seek consent from the actual party. As such, focusing on the party and their control over their data is likely the direct approach in requesting such information, opposed to Rule 45 requests on the third parties.

No Request, No Motion to Compel

The Plaintiff in ADT Sec. Servs. v. Pinancle Sec., LLC, objected to a Magistrate Judge’s denial to a motion to compel to redo the Defendant’s search for responsive ESI.

The Plaintiff’s argued the Defendants failed to search individual employee computers and back-up tapes.

Additionally, the Plaintiff’s highlighted a considerable disparity between the volume of ESI produced by the Plaintiff verse the Defendant. ADT Sec. Servs. v. Pinancle Sec., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98948 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2012).

As such (in the Plaintiff’s argument), the disparity demonstrated the Defendant did not produce enough ESI, thus requiring additional searches.

Discovery Order to Conduct Additional Searches

The Magistrate Judge did not find any “legitimate basis for requiring Pinnacle to re-do its extensive ESI search” based on only a general assertion that documents must be missing. ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

A motion to compel discovery should identify the responses that are inadequate and what information is necessary to make them adequate.  ADT Sec. Servs. at *5-6. The Plaintiff only made a general assertion that the searches were inadequate and thus the motion failed in a broad court order. Id.

However, the Magistrate Judge did issue a limited order to re-search seven employee computers, because there was evidence the computers might have contained ESI missing from the original production.  ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

The District Court found the Magistrate Judge’s order was reasonable and not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, because the seven computers ordered to be searched were used by individuals whose correspondence had been specifically requested by the Plaintiff with specific search terms. ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

Moreover, the Plaintiff’s motion to compel the search of 10 additional custodians with new search terms violated the principle that “…[t]o further the application of the proportionality standard in discovery, requests for production of ESI and related responses should be reasonably targeted, clear, and as specific as practicable.” ADT Sec. Servs. at *7, citing Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery Committee, Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, Principle 1.03 (2010).

Based on the above, the Court found the Magistrate Judge’s order was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. ADT Sec. Servs. at *7-8.

Bow Tie Thoughts

There are procedural horror stories of attorneys bringing motions to compel discovery without an underlining discovery request. Such motions should be denied, because you cannot have a motion to compel without first requesting specific discovery.

Discovery is not supposed to be a monkey throwing darts wildly, hoping one hits the target. However, there can be challenges in determining the relevant custodians, what to specifically request, and the sources of electronically stored information. These challenges can make the brightest lawyer feel like the dart throwing monkey.

There are situations when it comes to eDiscovery where motion practice can be justified. If a production is reviewed in software that shows relationships between email messages, additional custodians may be identified who were not included in the original production. This can easily result in supplemental discovery or possibly motion practice. Hopefully, there is a meet and confer and ESI that is responsive is produced without spending money on motion practice.

eDiscovery Does Not Mean Esoteric Discovery

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., is a breach of contract case involving multiple eDiscovery disputes.  According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant did the following:

Destroyed relevant email evidence, including an email server;

Failed to produce responsive documents in discovery due to the above failure; and

Failed to run appropriate ESI searches on Defendants’ computers.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs. v. Floorgraphics, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543, at *3 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012).

The Plaintiffs further argued the Defendants needed to produce additional discovery and sanctions were warranted. Additionally, the Plaintiffs sought a neutral computer forensic expert to conduct an evaluation of Defendants’ computer systems. Id.

e-Discovery Mea Culpa

The Defendants countered that no discovery had been destroyed, but admitted that their discovery production was deficient.  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *3-4.

The Defendants explained [conceded] that they searched the wrong computers and applied the wrong search terms. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *4.

However, the Defendants stated they attempted to correct every deficiency and would continue to do so. Id.

Regarding the “destroyed” email server, the Defendants stated it was a “pass-through” server that had been reformatted.  Id. The Defendants explained the server would push incoming emails through the server to individual computers. Id. According to the Defendants, there was no ESI on this pass-through server. Id.

As part of their mea culpa, the Defendants proclaimed they would make witnesses available to be re-deposed and pay the reasonable attorneys fees for the depositions. Id. Moreover, any motions to compel were premature, because they were producing hundreds of thousands of documents. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5.

The Court’s Findings

The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue.

Magistrate Judge Mark Falk

The Court’s conclusions on the dispute were direct and to the point:

One, the request to compel discovery is premature. Defendants admit that they used incorrect ESI search terms and did not search all of the appropriate avenues of electronic information. They have represented to the Court that 230,000 documents are in the process of being produced and that the production is being checked and re-checked by Defendants’ computer experts to ensure its accuracy. Thus, there is no basis for an order compelling the production of documents until, at least, Defendants’ production is complete.

Two, it appears that Defendants failed to meet their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) ESI obligations at the outset of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C). The briefing discloses that Defendants’ counsel was not aware of the structure of Defendants’ computer systems until recently. It is inappropriate for Defendants to only now—three years after the case was filed and after discovery has closed—investigate their electronic systems.

Three, the Court is unable to determine whether information was contained on Defendants’ “reformatted,” “pass through” server. The parties’ positions on this are diametrically different and consist of unsupported conclusions laced with hyperbole.

Four, it is unclear whether ESI allegedly destroyed (or “passed through” Defendants’ server) may be recovered and, if so, the cost of doing so. This important issue is not adequately addressed in the papers.

Five, it is unclear whether the burden and expense of conducting the electronic discovery outweighs the benefit of doing so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The Court cannot discern from the papers whether a deep forensic search is justified.

Six, the appointment of a neutral computer expert is not called for at this time. In effect, it would transfer the ESI obligations of the parties to the Court. Stated another way, the issues are not sufficiently articulated for the Court to appoint an expert to embark on an unlimited search.

Seven, there is no basis for the Court to consider spoilation sanctions (or any sanctions) until, at least, Defendants complete their discovery production and the questions raised above are answered.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5-7, (emphasis added).

The Court allowed the Plaintiff to take the 30(b)(6) deposition of the Defendants’ eDiscovery PMK that would be binding on the Defendant. The parties were directed to meet and confer on the deponent. Additionally, the PMK needed to be able to address whether any ESI could be recovered and the specific cost to do so. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7.

In the event there were still eDiscovery disputes after the deposition, the Court stated:

[T]he parties may simultaneously submit letters (double spaced, not to exceed ten pages) explaining the relevance and importance of the discovery and the benefits and burdens associated with the discovery—e.g., whether the costs and effort of securing the discovery is proportional to the expected result. Any letter from counsel must be accompanied by an affidavit from the party’s ESI expert which addresses the technical aspects of the dispute. The ESI expert’s affidavit must discuss the projected costs of proceeding with as much specificity as possible. General, conclusory statements—e.g., “it will be prohibitively expensive”—are unacceptable.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7-8.

The Court’s opinion sent a very strong message on the discovery disputes between the parties: The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8 (emphasis added).

The Court was blunt in advising the parties it was “wary of the use of broad and ambiguous electronic discovery requests as a litigation tactic or as a ‘fishing expedition.’” Id. Moreover, the Court stated it was “troubling” for this level of discovery dispute to surface after 18 months of discovery.  Id. Additionally, the Court effectively sent an ethical message to the parties to “proceed in good faith, take reasonable positions, and attempt to resolve their dispute in accordance with the Guidelines For Litigation Conduct.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7-8.

The opinion concludes with the warning the Court “not hesitate to award substantial fees to the non-prevailing party or any party found to be proceeding in bad faith.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8-9.

Bow Tie Thoughts

I was impressed with Judge Mark Falk’s outlining of case issues and his order. Additionally, the Defendants attempts to correct their mistakes were very respectable.

This opinion highlights multiple eDiscovery issues that are taking place all over the United States: 1) The Duty of Competency in eDiscovery; 2) Providing the Court adequate information to make rulings; and 3) Do not forget the merits of the lawsuit with electronic discovery issues.

The Duty of Competency and eDiscovery has been slowly developing issue since December 2006. There are many attorneys who outright admit they do not understand preservation, review methodologies or discovery productions. One friend recently told me his firm just asks for paper productions because of the lack of knowledge in what to request.

In the current case, the Court stated, “It is inappropriate for Defendants to only now—three years after the case was filed and after discovery has closed—investigate their electronic systems.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5-6. Moreover, the Court it was “troubling” to have this sort of discovery dispute after 18 months of discovery. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8.

How can attorneys best meet their duty of competency in eDiscovery? While every client is different, it is important to have a discovery plan from the inception of the case. This may include in-depth client interviews with the parties, custodians, and IT staff (to name a few), to learn how the client uses technology. How does their email system work? Do they text or iMessage?  What sorts of computers do they use? Any tablets? Voicemail? Any personal devices used for business?

I believe the Duty of Competency requires attorneys to either understand their client’s technology themselves or at a minimum, hire a consultant to help the attorneys navigate the issues. Without such investigation, it is difficult to meet one’s ethical duty of candor to the court on the facts of the lawsuit and provide competent representation of their clients.

As to the second issue, lawyers cannot simply walk into court and tell a judge, “Your Honor, it’s expensive.”  The first questions from the Court will be “why and how much.” The answer cannot simply be “Because it is.”

Attorneys need to argue ESI is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)) or that the burden and expense of conducting the electronic discovery outweighs the benefit of doing so (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)), with specific information, most likely from an eDiscovery expert or IT professional.

The unofficial standard for demonstrating undue burden or expense might be from Judge Facciola’s United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6412, 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2011) opinion: “In excruciating, but highly educational and useful, detail.”

Judges want to have enough information that they can make the right decision. While there will be attorneys simply proclaiming searching a hard drive is expensive, the better litigation practice is to have a well documented affidavit outlining the process and cost to search for specific ESI.

Finally, Judge Falk’s statement “The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue,” should go on t-shirts at e-Discovery conferences. It is easy to become enamored with search technology, collection methodologies and every other eDiscovery issue. However, every eDiscovery issue should be framed around the facts of the lawsuit, the causes of action and be relevant to competently move the case forward. The technology exists to enable lawyers to practice law, not to overshadow the merits of the case.

Reasonable Particularity in Requesting ESI

In an age discrimination suit, a Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery was denied by a Magistrate Judge on the grounds the requests were overboard.  The Plaintiff challenged Magistrate’s order.  The District Court found the requests were also overboard. Doubt v. NCR Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95518, 11-12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011).

Below are three examples of the discovery requests at issue in the motion:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 128:Each and every document, whether piece of electronically stored information, email, including attachments thereto, memorandum, text message, or piece of correspondence emanating from someone, rather than being part of a manual, that inquired in 2008 about the earnings of, and/or overtime worked by, a Customer Engineer whom NCR was considering to be either put on PIP, scheduled for termination, or terminated.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 133:Each and every document, whether piece of electronically stored information, email, including attachments thereto, memorandum, text message, or piece of correspondence emanating from someone, rather than being part of a manual, that prior to September 15, 2008 reflects NCR employees or consultants discussing, reflecting upon, or speculating as to, any amounts that might have to be paid to Customer Engineer 2s and a group as a result of the Teeter v. NCR class action, ED CV 08-00297-SGL.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 141 []: Each and every document, whether piece of electronically stored information, email, including attachments thereto, memorandum, text message, or piece of correspondence emanating from someone, rather than being part of a manual, that was sent to or from, or circulated among NCR management that reflects NCR management awareness in 2008 of, and/or discussion of, the amount of overtime being worked by Customer Engineers in 2008.

Doubt, at *8-9, 10-11.

A discovery request must both be relevant to a party’s claims or defenses and “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”  Doubt, at *11, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34 states that a discovery “must describe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items.” Doubt, at *11, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34.

The Court explained that the requests were not limited in scope as to sender, recipients or subject matter, even through the requests were limited to 2007 and 2008.  Doubt, at *11.

The Court held the discovery requests were overbroad and failed to describe with “reasonable particularity” the ESI to be produced.  The Court stated the request’s “expansive sweep” would include information that would be not relevant to the lawsuit and be unduly burdensome.  Doubt, at *11.

The Court described the requests would require the Defendant to search all of their administrative records regarding customer engineers from all of the employees about general topics.  Doubt, at *11-12.

The Plaintiff argued the requests were relevant to the pretext element of his age discrimination, however, the Court explained that such evidence would need to relate to managers, not every employee in a company.  Doubt, at *12.  Since the requests were not limited to correspondence between management and limited to specific subject matter, the discovery requests were overbroad.  Id.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Drafting discovery requests is an art.

Drafting discovery requests in the age of email, text message and social media requires an attorney to have the hands of a surgeon to request specifically what is relevant to his client’s claims or defenses with “reasonable particularity.”

A surgeon’s skill is not simply needed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rules 26 and 34, but to avoid actually having to review a nightmare amount of data.

If a party actually produced email and attachments after searching an entire corporate exchange server of only 100 people, there would be potentially an extreme amount of data to review.

Just imagine how much email you get in one hour. Multiple it by 100. Now imagine that amount over two years to get an idea of the volume.

For both a requesting or producing party, technology such as “early case [data] assessment” can be extremely helpful in identifying relevant discovery.  However, ECDA cannot limit ESI for identification without first determining what is being searched with “reasonable particularity.”

In identifying ESI with “reasonable particularity” at a minimum includes the type of ESI (email, Excel, text message), the author of the ESI (Email Sender or who drafted a file), Recipients of messages, date ranges and keywords designed to identify ESI relevant to a party’s claims or defenses.

There can be many other factors for attorneys and e-Discovery consultants to consider, but thinking in these terms would be a good starting point in drafting discovery requests by first considering how data would be searched for production.

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