Please Don’t Bates Stamp eDiscovery

Silly ClownThis case is my eDiscovery nightmare.

Worse than a clown with snakes.

Let’s review what happened.

The case involved numerous allegations of discovery wrongdoing against the Plaintiff.

The Defendants brought a motion for “discovery abuses intended to harass defendants, cause unnecessary delay, and needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”

The Defendants claimed they had spent $51,122 in legal fees and expenses related to the Plaintiffs’ “document dump.”

The motion was granted and denied in part. Branhaven, LLC v. Beeftek, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13364, 13-14, 22 (D. Md. Jan. 4, 2013).

It Started Like Any Other eDiscovery Dispute…

The litigation had the “traditional” eDiscovery dispute with the Plaintiffs not producing email ESI, because they had not accessed the information, and other significant production delays. As the rather hot bench explained:

Plaintiff’s delay in addressing the lack of access to these email servers is inexcusable. There is no more obvious and critical source of information in the 21st century than a company’s email accounts.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s failure to identify and produce this discovery in a timely fashion and in an acceptable form and manner while suggesting — if not misleading defendants — that it had identified responsive documents is sanctionable.

Branhaven, at *13-14.

Things continued to be problematic for the Plaintiffs, who claimed ESI from laptops would be produced in what the Court described as “blithely” assertions that discovery would be produced “at a mutually convenient time.” In reality, the subject laptops had not been sent to the client (presumedly to for review, raising the issue why hadn’t the hard drives been imaged), until a new associate attorney found them. Branhaven, at *14. Their conduct ultimately resulted in sanctions in the form of fees and costs.

…and then Came the PDFs and Whether the ESI Should Have Been Produced as TIFFs with Bates Numbers to be in a Reasonably Useable Form

BatesNumberingThe Plaintiffs produced their ESI as PDF’s. The Defendants challenged the production, because the production was untimely and not in TIFF format with Bates Numbers on every page. Branhaven, at *14-15.

The nightmare of a TIFF over a PDF production with Bates Stamps included the Plaintiffs arguing that the discovery request did not request Bates Stamps; nor is it an express requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, case law or the local discovery guidelines. Branhaven, at *16.

Moreover, the Protocol for Discovery of Electronically Stored Information (Local Rules of District of Maryland) which states that TIFF is the preferred format is only advisory. The Court called this a “weak defense.” Id.

The Court stated the following on the production:

Moreover, as defendants point out, Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) provides two options regarding the form in which a party may produce documents and plaintiff did not satisfy either. The July 20 production was not in a form “in which it is ordinarily maintained” or in “a reasonably usable form” — as Mr. McNeil showed (especially considering the lateness of the production with depositions looming in a few days). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 34 warn that: “[a] party that responds to a discovery request by simply producing electronically stored information in a form of its choice, without identifying that form in advance of the production in the response required by Rule 34(b) runs the risk that the requesting party can show that the produced form is not reasonably usable . . .” (emphasis added). That is precisely what happened here. Branhaven did not advise of the intended form of its production in its March response. Defendant was blindsided by the volume of the documents (since the prior productions consisted of 388 pages). Moreover, defendants had every reason to think that the documents would be completely Bates-stamped, as prior productions were and further defendants had no reason to think that this production would be so incredibly voluminous, as to require special arrangements and explicit agreement.

Branhaven, at *16-17.

The crux of production issue was whether or not the PDF’s were in a reasonably useable form. The Court held they were not, because of the lack of Bates Numbers and the fact they were not in TIFF format. Branhaven, at *17. Additionally, because of the production, the Court awarded the Defendants “the reasonable litigation support costs involved in receiving and processing” the document production. Branhaven, at *19.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Why is this a case a nightmare for me? Because it applies a paper model of discovery to electronically stored information, requiring a conversion of ESI into a TIFF with Bates Stamps (a conversion which can triple processing costs with some service providers). What is even stranger about it is the form of production battle centered on PDFs vs TIFF, both of which are static images. One difference is a PDF can be either non-searchable (thus like a TIFF) or searchable (thus more like a native file).

Demanding electronically stored information be converted to a static image with Bates Numbers is right up there with demanding MP3s be reversed burned to 8 Track. A party should have a good reason to take a native file, that is fully searchable and strip its searchable features. This truly makes it like a piece of paper, rendering the review tools that can do everything from sorting data in chronological order to technology assisted review be useless. It is like trying to fuel a hybrid car with coal.

Removing ESI’s searchable features also violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a substantial body of case law.

Moreover, claiming there is a functional difference between PDF vs TIFF as static images is like fighting over VHS vs Beta. The problem with such fights is we are in the 21st Century and not the 1970s. It is almost like arguing Beta is better than Video on Demand, because the issue is not the form, but whether you can analyze the content.

What drives these all too frequent fights? It is attorneys who want pieces of paper to have Bates Stamps. This worked up until the 1990s, but we now live in a world where the content on a smartphone can fill the first floor of a library. Data needs to be reviewed as data for there to be any chance to meaningfully understand its content. Moreover, as to the Bates Numbering to organize the ESI issue, native files can have a “control number” that is the functional equivalent of a Bates Number for management in a review platform. If there is still a concern about whether a file has been changed, parties can use MD5 hash values instead, to ensure the ESI has not been modified.

Finally, I believe forward thinking local rules are extremely helpful for litigants. However, as technology changes, these rules need to be updated to incorporate how computer-assisted review can cut costs, advances in processing or even the cost-effectiveness of remote depositions. What was forward thinking in 2006 can be outdated in 2013.

In the end, converting standard ESI like email to TIFFs to brand Bates Numbers should give lawyers nightmares of high processing costs, slow manual review and unhappy clients. It should only be done when the native file itself is not in a reasonably useable form, thus the static image is the only reasonably useable form.

No Expert Testimony, No Motion to Compel

A court should be hesitant to resolve issues that demand technical expertise.

Magistrate Judge James C Francis IV

In a case with dueling motions to compel, the parties disputed the adequacy of search terms. Magistrate Judge James C Francis IV wrote a profoundly important warning to attorneys and judges on search terms: A court should be hesitant to resolve issues that demand technical expertise. Assured Guar. Mun. Corp. v. UBS Real Estate Sec. Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167981, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).

VintageComputerGeek

Neither of the parties submitted to the Court expert affidavits on the adequacy of the search terms. Judge Francis stated that expert testimony was “necessary for [him] to offer an opinion as to the most efficient, search protocol.” Assured Guar. Mun. Corp., at *12.

The Court noted that search term adequacy “is a complicated question involving the interplay, at least, of the sciences of computer technology, statistics and linguistics. Assured Guar. Mun. Corp., at *11-12, citing George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, “Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?”, 13 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 10 (2007).

The Court also cited to the archangel of search term cases to highlight the difficulty in analyzing search term efficiency:

…for lawyers and judges to dare opine that a certain search term or terms would be more likely to produce information than the terms that were used is truly to go where angels fear to tread.

Assured Guar. Mun. Corp., at *12, citing United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14, 24 (D.D.C. 2008).

The Court stated the parties had three options:

They can cooperate (along with their technical consultants) and attempt to agree on an appropriate set of search criteria;

They can refile a motion to compel, supported by expert testimony; Or,

They can request the appointment of a neutral consultant who will design a search strategy.

Assured Guar. Mun. Corp., at *12.

Bow Tie Thoughts

eDiscovery requires expert knowledge. It is extremely dangerous for courts and parties to engage in determining search terms without having at least one expert who understands what technology to apply to a case to help attorneys make the legal determination what is relevant; identify what is responsive to discovery requests; and determine what ESI is privileged.

There have been too many eDiscovery opinions this year that most likely did not have an eDiscovery consultant assisting either party. I am greatly concerned the recent case management orders that limited parties to five search terms per custodian was purely an arbitrary number and lacked any expert involvement in analyzing the data before any such motion practice.

This is as dangerous as an accountant telling a doctor what procedures they can use to treat an emergency room patient before any triage takes place. The accountant is in no position to know what is best for patient care.

If determining search terms efficiency is the work of angels, limiting search terms without consulting an expert is embracing the dark ages at best and malpractice at worse. Why risk limiting your ability to find what is relevant to your case? Why risk driving up discovery costs by making searching for ESI harder?

Conversely, would any attorney agree to limiting their legal research to the arbitrary number of 3 terms and prohibiting the consultation of a research attorney to “lower costs”? Most likely no.

The answer to controlling eDiscovery costs is not limiting the tools to find what is responsive, but the education of attorneys and judges in understanding how to conduct eDiscovery. Highlighting the need for eDiscovery education, one recent opinion had a judge hold that TIFF’s are a form of production “that is easily searchable for specific terms.” Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148282 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2012).

Tagged Image File Format is not searchable. Parties convert ESI to TIFF’s (usually at any additional processing cost) to make the native files not searchable. A production with TIFF’s would require extracted text, substantive and/or embedded metadata, or the TIFF’s to have optical character recognition (OCR) to be in a reasonably useable form without searchable features denigrated. Saying TIFF’s are searchable is simply wrong.

Judge Francis was profoundly correct when he stated, “A court should be hesitant to resolve issues that demand technical expertise.” eDiscovery requires attorneys being competent to understand their client’s ESI, which should involve having enough education on eDiscovery to know when to bring in an expert for help; determining whether or not search terms are effective requires such expert assistance.

Drop-by-Drop Water Torture Productions

There are judges who have a way with words when they want to make a point. One example of such judicial prose was by Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows in Botell v. United States:

At this juncture, the United States has purportedly been looking for documents for months, yet the undersigned, to the date of the hearing, does not have confidence that an organized, thorough search has been performed. Rather, defendant’s document production performance in these proceedings has been akin to a drop-by-drop water torture. At some point, plaintiff must be protected from the United States’ further belated production of pertinent documents. The court now enters a preclusion order prohibiting the United States from presenting evidence in its case that had been requested by plaintiffs in the Requests for Production, but which has not been produced by the date of compliance with this order.

Botell v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134265, 15-16 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012).

Botell v. United States is a wrongful death and personal injury case involving a minor injured and another killed at a National Park. The Government produced over 7,000 pages of documents, but there was a “a glaring lack of production of emails from defendant’s agents and employees.” Botell, at *11-13. Moreover, the total number of custodians produced by the Defendant totaled one.

The Plaintiffs argued five other relevant custodians’ emails needed to be produced, because the custodians were referenced in the already produced ESI. Botell, at *11.

The Defendants produced one declaration by the Chief Ranger at the park, which explained his efforts to find responsive email.

These efforts included “searching” the office and network drives, and the Ranger’s coordination with officials and IT personnel at another National Park to search another custodian’s computer. The declaration was silent on any search for emails by the other custodians. Botell, at *11-12.

Another declaration curtly explained the back-up policy for Lotus Notes emails as follows: “[B]ack-up emails are retained for 30 days only, unless they are subject to a litigation hold notice or pertain to the BP Gulf Oil spill.” Botell, at *12.

The Court ordered the Defendants to provide a declaration explaining the searches conducted to locate physical and electronic copies of responsive emails by the five custodians. The Court specifically required the following:

The declaration shall state the steps taken to locate these emails, whether any such emails exist, and if not, a definitive statement that they no longer exist. If further responsive documents are located, they shall be produced at the time declarations are filed.

Botell, at *12-13.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Nothing goes for the jugular like a preclusion order for failing to produce discovery. Botell is a powerful example of the dangers of what appeared to be “do it yourself” collection. While it was not outright stated the Defendant did not have an eDiscovery collection expert, it sure sounds that way from the context of the declarations.

One would hope when a large organization has a triggering event for a lawsuit, an effective litigation hold is enacted. Many of today’s records information management systems have the ability to electronically sequester a specific custodian’s email and ESI with a keystroke. Additionally, much of this technology has Early Case Assessment and data reduction features that can identify the relevant information for attorneys to review.

An organization should either have professionals trained in the search and preservation of ESI or retain outside professionals to competently preserve ESI. The steps taken to search and identify responsive ESI must be documented and should, at a minimum, explain the search methodology; technology used; data sources searched; search results; possible exclusions or exotic files; and anything else relevant to explain to a judge how ESI was searched.

A requesting party should not have to blink “torture” in Morse Code for a judge to stop a party neglecting their discovery obligations. An attorney’s duty of competency should compel their preservation obligations are met with those trained to effectively find and produce responsive discovery.

Forensically Examining A Lawyer’s Computer

In a dispute over a will and deed transfer, a New York State Court ordered the examination of a lawyer’s computer.

The idea of an attorney’s computer being searched by third parties should scare lawyers to death.

The attorney objected on the grounds the examination would violate the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for all of the attorney’s other clients.

The Court was also concerned about privilege issues and ordered the following examination:

The computer forensic examiner was directed to review the computer only for documents that refer to Rose Tilimbo and it must not examine files which would not likely lead to the discovery of evidence related to Rose Tilimbo.

In the event the forensic examiner inadvertently examined any information that was not related to Rose it is directed to immediately cease the examination of that file.

In the event that forensic examiner located documents that refer directly to Rose Tilimbo or appear to be related to the purported will or the alleged deed transfer, those documents shall be mailed to the parties’ attorneys.

The attorneys would have 14 days from the receipt of documents to object to disclosure to the movants by notifying counsel for the movants that he is objecting and sending the documents to the court for an in camera inspection together with the reasons for the objection.

In the event that no objections are made to the production of the documents or the court rules that the documents are to be disclosed the computer forensic examiner may thereafter submit the documents to movants’ counsel.

Matter of Tilimbo v. Posimato, 2012 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4027, at *13-14 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Aug. 22, 2012) (Emphases added).

Bow Tie Thoughts

It is very good to see a state court judge address the privilege issues of how to examine a lawyer’s computer.

If you ask three different computer forensic examiners how they would comply with the Court Order, you would probably have three different answers. The right approach will depend on how data is stored and multiple other factors best left to the experts.

One option is to make a “mirror image” of the computer and then search for responsive data. This is likely the least desirable for the attorney, because the entire contents of his computer have now been copied and are in the hands of a third-party. Short of a protective order and the computer experts acting as court-appointed neutral examiners who return or destroy the mirror image at the end of the examination, this is least desirable from an attorney’s perspective.

There is software available where the attorney could effectively self-collect his client files. While this might provide the most piece of mind to the attorney, it likely causes the most stress for the requesting party. It also raises issues of how searches were conducted and can easily cast doubt on the adequacy of the collection.

Another option is for a targeted collection of the attorney’s hard drive. This might take more time then doing a mirror image of the hard drive, but provides more piece of mind to the attorney. The collection is based on search terms devised by the computer forensic expert and attorneys to specifically identify the relevant information. This conceptually is a good middle ground approach to both preserve the parties’ interests and the confidentiality of the attorney’s clients.

Instead of the computer forensic examiner “mailing” documents to the attorneys, a hosted repository is an option the parties and court should consider. The producing party could first review the responsive information for any privileged ESI, creating all the necessary information for a privilege log right in the database. The requesting party could then perform its own review and note any challenges to any asserted privileges. The Court itself could then review the information “in camera” and rule on any privilege issues without protracted motion practice.

You Do Have to Look for Discovery in Your Possession

A Producing Party (the Defendant) argued against searching for responsive electronically stored information, claiming “that the mere fact an employee might have discoverable information or relevant knowledge does not necessarily mean she possesses relevant documents.” McNearney v. Wash. Dep’t of Corr., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108386, 14-16 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 1, 2012).

Negative inductive reasoning aside, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 34 requires a party “to produce requested documents if they are within his ‘possession, custody, or control.’” McNearney, at *14, citing Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 165 n.6 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Producing Party did not challenge that it failed to search for responsive electronically stored information from “numerous employees identified as likely having discoverable [information],” but took the position that just because it was possible the custodians had relevant information, did not mean they actually had the relevant information.  McNearney, at *14.

The Court agreed with the logic, but that did not give the Producing Party a free pass on its duty to make a reasonable inquiry, especially considering the fact the Producing Party identified the employee as likely having relevant information. Id.

Further causing problems for the production, was a difference in email messages produced by the Defendant and two other Defense custodians, suggesting that there had not been a reasonable search for email by one of the Defense custodians. McNearney, at *14-15.

The Producing Party also conceded that it did not produce email attachments and that its search scope was narrower than the Plaintiff’s discovery requests. McNearney, at *15.

The Court held the following on the Defendant’s search:

Defendant’s production of some documents in response to RFP No. 5 does not satisfy its duty to make a reasonable search for and produce all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control. Despite its original objection that RFP No. 5 was unduly burdensome because it was “a trap for Defendants,” DOC has not demonstrated that conducting a thorough search for responsive ESI would pose an undue burden or cost, as required in responding to a motion to compel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

McNearney, at *15-16 (Emphasis added).

Bow Tie Thoughts

A party must demonstrate undue burden to limit discovery. This does not include an argument “that just because there might be something relevant, does not mean there is something relevant.”  While that is true in a logical discussion during a philosophy class, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not an exercise in metaphysical nihilism to circumvent a party’s duty to conduct a reasonable search for responsive ESI to a discovery request.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require ESI to be produced as it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably useable form. By the plain language of “ordinarily maintained,” a producing party cannot break the parent-child relationship between email messages and their attachments (or Tweets and Hyperlinks or text messages with photos).  Additionally, a production that breaks the parent-child relationship is not in a “reasonably useable form,” since searching for an attachment to its corresponding message is like re-unitizing a document that has had its staples removed and the pages shuffled with 1,000 other pages.

The technology to collect, search and produce electronically stored information are well established now after a decade of being available. These products are common services offered by eDiscovery service providers and many law firms have brought these technologies in house. While electronic discovery has many challenges, there are solutions available to these challenges that are affordable.

No Request, No Motion to Compel

The Plaintiff in ADT Sec. Servs. v. Pinancle Sec., LLC, objected to a Magistrate Judge’s denial to a motion to compel to redo the Defendant’s search for responsive ESI.

The Plaintiff’s argued the Defendants failed to search individual employee computers and back-up tapes.

Additionally, the Plaintiff’s highlighted a considerable disparity between the volume of ESI produced by the Plaintiff verse the Defendant. ADT Sec. Servs. v. Pinancle Sec., LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98948 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2012).

As such (in the Plaintiff’s argument), the disparity demonstrated the Defendant did not produce enough ESI, thus requiring additional searches.

Discovery Order to Conduct Additional Searches

The Magistrate Judge did not find any “legitimate basis for requiring Pinnacle to re-do its extensive ESI search” based on only a general assertion that documents must be missing. ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

A motion to compel discovery should identify the responses that are inadequate and what information is necessary to make them adequate.  ADT Sec. Servs. at *5-6. The Plaintiff only made a general assertion that the searches were inadequate and thus the motion failed in a broad court order. Id.

However, the Magistrate Judge did issue a limited order to re-search seven employee computers, because there was evidence the computers might have contained ESI missing from the original production.  ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

The District Court found the Magistrate Judge’s order was reasonable and not clearly erroneous or contrary to law, because the seven computers ordered to be searched were used by individuals whose correspondence had been specifically requested by the Plaintiff with specific search terms. ADT Sec. Servs. at *6.

Moreover, the Plaintiff’s motion to compel the search of 10 additional custodians with new search terms violated the principle that “…[t]o further the application of the proportionality standard in discovery, requests for production of ESI and related responses should be reasonably targeted, clear, and as specific as practicable.” ADT Sec. Servs. at *7, citing Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery Committee, Principles Relating to the Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, Principle 1.03 (2010).

Based on the above, the Court found the Magistrate Judge’s order was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. ADT Sec. Servs. at *7-8.

Bow Tie Thoughts

There are procedural horror stories of attorneys bringing motions to compel discovery without an underlining discovery request. Such motions should be denied, because you cannot have a motion to compel without first requesting specific discovery.

Discovery is not supposed to be a monkey throwing darts wildly, hoping one hits the target. However, there can be challenges in determining the relevant custodians, what to specifically request, and the sources of electronically stored information. These challenges can make the brightest lawyer feel like the dart throwing monkey.

There are situations when it comes to eDiscovery where motion practice can be justified. If a production is reviewed in software that shows relationships between email messages, additional custodians may be identified who were not included in the original production. This can easily result in supplemental discovery or possibly motion practice. Hopefully, there is a meet and confer and ESI that is responsive is produced without spending money on motion practice.

Striking Undisclosed Audio Recordings

In a summary judgment battle, the Plaintiff referenced audio recordings in opposition to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.

The Defendant brought a motion to strike the audio recordings, because the audio was neither disclosed nor produced in discovery. Rector v. Town of Fishers, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81771 (S.D. Ind. June 13, 2012).

The Court tossed out the audio recordings like they were 8 track cassettes.

Turning Up the Discovery Gain

The discovery dispute involved audio recordings the Plaintiff made of conversations with one of the Defendant’s employees. These recordings were never produced in discovery, despite a request for any statements, including recorded, that referenced the events in the lawsuit. Rector, at *1-2.

The Discovery Amplifier

The Court explained the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted to make trial practice fair and not a “game of blind man’s bluff.”  Rector, at *2.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) imposes affirmative disclosure obligations on parties to disclose “all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Rector, at *2, citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).

Grazing Effect on the Court

The Court found the audio recordings should have been produced under Rule 26(a), noting that the Plaintiff included the recordings in their opposition to the Defendant’s summary judgment motion.  Rector, at *3. Moreover, the Plaintiff was also obligated to produce the recordings pursuant to the Defendant’s Rule 34 request. Id.

One does not need noise canceling headphones to hear the Court’s message that the audio recordings should have been produced:

Indeed, so clear is the discoverability of the audiotape that the Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel has been unable to explain why the audiotape was not produced during discovery.

Rector, at *3.

Discovery Zenith 

The Court explained that pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), when a party withholds information that should have been included in its initial disclosures, “[t]he exclusion of non-disclosed evidence is automatic and mandatory under Rule 37(c)(1) unless non-disclosure was justified or harmless.” Rector, at *3, citing Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs., 356 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2004).

The Court’s stated the following in its order to excluded the audio recordings:

Given the Plaintiff’s inability to explain its non-production, the Court cannot find that the non-disclosure was justified. As for harmlessness, the Plaintiff does not argue it. Even if the Plaintiff had, the Court would reject here. The Defendant prepared its motion for summary judgment based upon what it believed to be the evidentiary record. Had it known about the audiotape, it might have structured its argument differently—or perhaps even avoided filing a motion altogether. Accordingly, consistent with Rule 37(c)(1), the Court will exclude the undisclosed evidence for the purposes of summary judgment.

Rector, at *3-4.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Highly skilled and competent lawyers have to think very broadly when discussing discovery with their clients. Virtually every smartphone has a recording feature. It certainly does not hurt to ask a client if the client recorded anything about the lawsuit, either on their phone or a digital recording device. While no one is expecting Garage Band to be in discovery, none of the drummers from Spinal Tap were expecting to spontaneously combust.

After determining whether any audio discovery exists, the next issue is reviewing it for whether it is relevant to the case or responsive to a discovery request. Many of the litigation support review platforms today can support audio discovery. Additionally, many litigation support service providers can also transcribe the audio, so the text is searchable in the review database.

Audio discovery should be included in client interviews to determine if any exists. If it does, verify with a service provider they can transcribe the audio and whether their hosted review platform supports audio files.

eDiscovery Does Not Mean Esoteric Discovery

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., is a breach of contract case involving multiple eDiscovery disputes.  According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant did the following:

Destroyed relevant email evidence, including an email server;

Failed to produce responsive documents in discovery due to the above failure; and

Failed to run appropriate ESI searches on Defendants’ computers.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs. v. Floorgraphics, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543, at *3 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012).

The Plaintiffs further argued the Defendants needed to produce additional discovery and sanctions were warranted. Additionally, the Plaintiffs sought a neutral computer forensic expert to conduct an evaluation of Defendants’ computer systems. Id.

e-Discovery Mea Culpa

The Defendants countered that no discovery had been destroyed, but admitted that their discovery production was deficient.  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *3-4.

The Defendants explained [conceded] that they searched the wrong computers and applied the wrong search terms. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *4.

However, the Defendants stated they attempted to correct every deficiency and would continue to do so. Id.

Regarding the “destroyed” email server, the Defendants stated it was a “pass-through” server that had been reformatted.  Id. The Defendants explained the server would push incoming emails through the server to individual computers. Id. According to the Defendants, there was no ESI on this pass-through server. Id.

As part of their mea culpa, the Defendants proclaimed they would make witnesses available to be re-deposed and pay the reasonable attorneys fees for the depositions. Id. Moreover, any motions to compel were premature, because they were producing hundreds of thousands of documents. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5.

The Court’s Findings

The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue.

Magistrate Judge Mark Falk

The Court’s conclusions on the dispute were direct and to the point:

One, the request to compel discovery is premature. Defendants admit that they used incorrect ESI search terms and did not search all of the appropriate avenues of electronic information. They have represented to the Court that 230,000 documents are in the process of being produced and that the production is being checked and re-checked by Defendants’ computer experts to ensure its accuracy. Thus, there is no basis for an order compelling the production of documents until, at least, Defendants’ production is complete.

Two, it appears that Defendants failed to meet their Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) ESI obligations at the outset of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)(C). The briefing discloses that Defendants’ counsel was not aware of the structure of Defendants’ computer systems until recently. It is inappropriate for Defendants to only now—three years after the case was filed and after discovery has closed—investigate their electronic systems.

Three, the Court is unable to determine whether information was contained on Defendants’ “reformatted,” “pass through” server. The parties’ positions on this are diametrically different and consist of unsupported conclusions laced with hyperbole.

Four, it is unclear whether ESI allegedly destroyed (or “passed through” Defendants’ server) may be recovered and, if so, the cost of doing so. This important issue is not adequately addressed in the papers.

Five, it is unclear whether the burden and expense of conducting the electronic discovery outweighs the benefit of doing so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). The Court cannot discern from the papers whether a deep forensic search is justified.

Six, the appointment of a neutral computer expert is not called for at this time. In effect, it would transfer the ESI obligations of the parties to the Court. Stated another way, the issues are not sufficiently articulated for the Court to appoint an expert to embark on an unlimited search.

Seven, there is no basis for the Court to consider spoilation sanctions (or any sanctions) until, at least, Defendants complete their discovery production and the questions raised above are answered.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5-7, (emphasis added).

The Court allowed the Plaintiff to take the 30(b)(6) deposition of the Defendants’ eDiscovery PMK that would be binding on the Defendant. The parties were directed to meet and confer on the deponent. Additionally, the PMK needed to be able to address whether any ESI could be recovered and the specific cost to do so. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7.

In the event there were still eDiscovery disputes after the deposition, the Court stated:

[T]he parties may simultaneously submit letters (double spaced, not to exceed ten pages) explaining the relevance and importance of the discovery and the benefits and burdens associated with the discovery—e.g., whether the costs and effort of securing the discovery is proportional to the expected result. Any letter from counsel must be accompanied by an affidavit from the party’s ESI expert which addresses the technical aspects of the dispute. The ESI expert’s affidavit must discuss the projected costs of proceeding with as much specificity as possible. General, conclusory statements—e.g., “it will be prohibitively expensive”—are unacceptable.

News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7-8.

The Court’s opinion sent a very strong message on the discovery disputes between the parties: The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8 (emphasis added).

The Court was blunt in advising the parties it was “wary of the use of broad and ambiguous electronic discovery requests as a litigation tactic or as a ‘fishing expedition.’” Id. Moreover, the Court stated it was “troubling” for this level of discovery dispute to surface after 18 months of discovery.  Id. Additionally, the Court effectively sent an ethical message to the parties to “proceed in good faith, take reasonable positions, and attempt to resolve their dispute in accordance with the Guidelines For Litigation Conduct.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *7-8.

The opinion concludes with the warning the Court “not hesitate to award substantial fees to the non-prevailing party or any party found to be proceeding in bad faith.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8-9.

Bow Tie Thoughts

I was impressed with Judge Mark Falk’s outlining of case issues and his order. Additionally, the Defendants attempts to correct their mistakes were very respectable.

This opinion highlights multiple eDiscovery issues that are taking place all over the United States: 1) The Duty of Competency in eDiscovery; 2) Providing the Court adequate information to make rulings; and 3) Do not forget the merits of the lawsuit with electronic discovery issues.

The Duty of Competency and eDiscovery has been slowly developing issue since December 2006. There are many attorneys who outright admit they do not understand preservation, review methodologies or discovery productions. One friend recently told me his firm just asks for paper productions because of the lack of knowledge in what to request.

In the current case, the Court stated, “It is inappropriate for Defendants to only now—three years after the case was filed and after discovery has closed—investigate their electronic systems.”  News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *5-6. Moreover, the Court it was “troubling” to have this sort of discovery dispute after 18 months of discovery. News Am. Mktg. In-Store Servs., at *8.

How can attorneys best meet their duty of competency in eDiscovery? While every client is different, it is important to have a discovery plan from the inception of the case. This may include in-depth client interviews with the parties, custodians, and IT staff (to name a few), to learn how the client uses technology. How does their email system work? Do they text or iMessage?  What sorts of computers do they use? Any tablets? Voicemail? Any personal devices used for business?

I believe the Duty of Competency requires attorneys to either understand their client’s technology themselves or at a minimum, hire a consultant to help the attorneys navigate the issues. Without such investigation, it is difficult to meet one’s ethical duty of candor to the court on the facts of the lawsuit and provide competent representation of their clients.

As to the second issue, lawyers cannot simply walk into court and tell a judge, “Your Honor, it’s expensive.”  The first questions from the Court will be “why and how much.” The answer cannot simply be “Because it is.”

Attorneys need to argue ESI is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B)) or that the burden and expense of conducting the electronic discovery outweighs the benefit of doing so (Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)), with specific information, most likely from an eDiscovery expert or IT professional.

The unofficial standard for demonstrating undue burden or expense might be from Judge Facciola’s United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6412, 1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2011) opinion: “In excruciating, but highly educational and useful, detail.”

Judges want to have enough information that they can make the right decision. While there will be attorneys simply proclaiming searching a hard drive is expensive, the better litigation practice is to have a well documented affidavit outlining the process and cost to search for specific ESI.

Finally, Judge Falk’s statement The case should be about the merits not some esoteric electronic discovery issue,” should go on t-shirts at e-Discovery conferences. It is easy to become enamored with search technology, collection methodologies and every other eDiscovery issue. However, every eDiscovery issue should be framed around the facts of the lawsuit, the causes of action and be relevant to competently move the case forward. The technology exists to enable lawyers to practice law, not to overshadow the merits of the case.