Rule 34 and TIFF Productions in the Clouds

CloudComputingHandGerman v. Micro Elecs., iNC., is an employment case that involved discovery disputes centering on the Plaintiff’s mitigation of damages, including among other issues, the Plaintiff’s calendars and online activity, including blogging and records-keeping.

The Plaintiff’s attorney claimed the Plaintiff had hardship in responding, because she could not afford to make copies, and her “advancing carpal tunnel [made] it increasingly difficult for her to do anything with her hands or writs, including the clicking of a touchpad on a [laptop], and even the advancing of a screen on her iPad.” German v. Micro Elecs., iNC., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4594 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2013).

The Plaintiff produced information she had copied from blogs and websites, which were then pasted into an email and printed by her attorney. The production was over 100 printed pages. The Court also noted that this production did not accurately identify the source of the text. German, at *18.

The Defendants considered the production deficient, because “it was not guaranteed to capture the original and complete text, formatting, and images of a blog or website.” The Defendants suggested production as PDF’s copies or a production format that was “reviewable and captures the documents in their original format.” German, at *18-19.

The Plaintiff claimed production as PDF screenshots was unduly burdensome and was not required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because the blog posts and other ESI were “ordinarily maintained” on external servers within multi-tiered web pages. As such, creating PDF’s would be time and cost-intensive, in addition to not being the form they were ordinarily maintained. German, at *19-20.

CloudTablet

The Court found the Plaintiff’s claim the production complied with Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii) to be “disingenuous,” because “It [was] beyond dispute that the one-hundred-page email document with copied and pasted excerpts from blog and website postings is not in the form “in which it is ordinarily maintained.’” German, at *23, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).

The Court also explained the production was not ”in a reasonably usable form,” because the production stripped “the entries of their original and complete text, formatting, images, and likely the source.” Id.

The Court noted N.D. Ohio L.R. App. K, Default Standard for Discovery of Electronically Stored Info. (“E-Discovery”), Standard 6, which states an “acceptable” default production format is a static image, not native format with accompanying metadata. German, at *23-24, citing In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D. Ohio 2012). (The Court noted that the ESI and metadata needed to be preserved and could be produced if there is a particularized need. German, at *24.)

The Court held the Plaintiff should have produced the online content as static images, because no form of production had been stated by the Defendants. Id.

Bow Tie Thoughts

The Court’s statement regarding N.D. Ohio L.R. App. K, Default Standard for Discovery of Electronically Stored Info. (“E-Discovery”), Standard 6, that static images are a default when no form of production is stated, seems to go against the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a volumes of case law, which state the searchable features of native files cannot be degraded in a discovery production. Moreover, the Court in Porsche stated, “This Court has expressed a preference for the production of electronically stored information in its native format.” In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes Prods. Liab. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D. Ohio 2012).

Granted, static images can be an accepted form of production, as long as the production includes extracted text and the metadata needed for the production to be searchable. TIFF’s, by their very nature, are not searchable. PDF may or may not be, depending on whether it is a searchable PDF. As such, the danger of a “static image” production is it would be as searchable as a paper production, except there are no boxes of paper to keep in a repository.

Producing ESI as static images can also dramatically increase processing costs in converting searchable native files into non-searchable static images.

However, this case was not the “standard” discovery dispute of email from Outlook or Excel files, but online content. These types of cases battling over the production of online content will become the “new normal,” given the use of webmail, social media and the vast use of smartphones and tablets to create content with remote computing systems.

It is very understandable that attorneys may not know how to have this information captured after a decade of case law focused on native files, metadata or maintaining the parent-child relationship between email and attachments.

“Cloud discovery” calls for a collection expert knowledgeable in “cloud” collections, who can develop the most cost and time effective means to capture responsive discovery in a legally defensible manner. It is also entirely possible, depending on the case, that searchable PDF’s would be a reasonably useable form for a cloud discovery production.

There are many tools available to collect cloud discovery, from HTTrack to X1 Discovery to Nextpoint, depending on the nature of the online content. There are many other options as well, which would likely all be cheaper than motion practice over the form of production.

Social Networking & Blogging Sneaks into a Supreme Court Opinion

The epic United States Supreme Court opinion on campaign finance reform sneaked in a passage on social networking and Free Speech.  The opinion is over 100 pages long, with Concurring and Dissenting opinions, so this is by no means a comprehensive review of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion. 

Justice Kennedy stated:

Rapid changes in technology — and the creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression — counsel against upholding a law that restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers. See Part II-C, supra. Today, 30-second television ads may be the most effective way to convey a political message. See McConnell, supra, at 261 (opinion of SCALIA, J.). Soon, however, it may be that Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking Web sites, will provide citizens with significant information about political candidates and issues. Yet, § 441b would seem to ban a blog post expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate if that blog were created with corporate funds. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a); MCFL, supra, at 249. The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 766, at *91-92 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2010).

The United States Supreme Court went on to overrule the law, stating, “…the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” Citizens United, at *93.

The extended passage is purely dicta in the Majority Opinion, but it highlights the fact the United States Supreme Court is keenly aware of social networking websites.  It is a matter of time before there is an opinion where a reference to Twitter or Facebook is part of a controlling opinion and not merely dicta.

Bow Tie Law 1st Anniversary

December 30, 2009 marks the first anniversary of “Bow Tie Law.” 

2009 was a watershed year of case law, with litigation hold opinions coming up weekly this summer; the mandatory exclusion of ESI for the failure to disclose or supplement discovery; and judges holding attorneys to a higher standard for electronically stored information.

Thank you everyone who has made Bow Tie Law “Year One” a success as we enter 2010.

Twitter: Prohibited Jury Communications in Missouri

The pending jury instructions from the Supreme Court of Missouri address Web 2.0 and instant communications head on.  The jury instruction specifically states:

You are not permitted to communicate, use a cell phone, record, photograph, video, e-mail, blog, tweet, text, or post anything about this trial or your thoughts or opinions about any issue in this case to any other person or to the Internet, “facebook”, “myspace”, “twitter”, or any other personal or public web site during the course of this trial or at any time before the formal acceptance of your verdict by me at the end of the case.

In re Revisions to Mai-Civil, 2009 Mo. LEXIS 544, 5-6 (Mo. Nov. 23, 2009), at *5-6

The rules state that a violation of the rules “may result in a miscarriage of justice, and a new trial may be required.”  In re Revisions to Mai-Civil, at *6. 

Bow Tie Thoughts

It is only responsible for Courts to promulgate Web 2.0 rules that on devices that create instant communications.  As the rules state, Courts want to avoid any miscarriages of justice.  The realities of 21st Century life allow prospective jurors to access news in a heartbeat.  More importantly, Courts cannot permit the justice system suffer from a juror Tweeting “God, I cannot stand this Defendant.”

101 Bow Ties

My 101st post is different than any of my other postings to date: Here is the story behind the Bow Tie Law Blog and my thoughts on the practice of law.

I have an amazing career.  While I was at CT Summation, I traveled to Alaska, across Canada, met with judges and saw classic Americana with witnessing the lighting of the Christmas Tree in Rockefeller Plaza and the dying of the river green in Chicago.  My adventures have continued with D4 LLC, including a visit to Niagara Falls after one seminar and I am publishing this blog while I am in US Virgin Islands for a full day e-Discovery event.  VI 074-publish

Stay tuned for a new webinar campaign this Fall, Paraben’s 2nd Annual Forensic Innovation Conference and a mock trial with the Beverley Hills Bar Association. 

Reasons for the Bow Tie Law Blog

I love the law.  I also love the intersection between law and technology.  This began in law school studying the pilot program for PACER and as a research assistant for Professor Fred Galves on his article Will Video Kill the Radio Star? Visual Learning and the Use of Display Technology in the Law School. For the record, I came up with the homage to the Buggles.

I started the Bow Tie Law Blog in December 2008.  While it was not the best of times (I had been laid off by a litigation support vendor), BTLB provided me an opportunity to discuss current cases and e-Discovery issues.

My First Litigation Support Software

I first used CT Summation LG Gold 2.6 and Trial Director on a project that was originally supposed to be three months.  It lasted thirteen.  The case went all the way through motions in limine before we settled. 

I learned a lot on that case.  First, it was easier to search through a database then climb into a document repository.  Second, a small firm that can “command evidence” with a litigation support database can take on a larger firm with a small army of associates on a case.

One thing I learned about scanned paper: Get the project OCR-ed.  We had thousands of TIFFs that we had to search and annotate without the benefit of optical character recognition processing.  We could have saved hours if we had the ability to search the text of those TIFFs.  Auto Coding would have been Heaven. 

The Future for Lawyers

Technology’s effect on how we live our lives is told in glowing hymns by Don Tapscott in grown up digital and negative thunderbolts by Mark Bauerlein’s The Dumbest Generation.  Regardless of whether you agree with these authors, people are walking ESI generators. 

There are 160,000 active lawyers in the State of California (217,000 if you count the inactive members).  All must consider electronically stored information since the enacted of the California Electronic Discovery Act on June 29, 2009 and the California Rules of Court 3.724 requiring ESI to be discussed in the meet and confer process. 

The immediate future for lawyers in California, the Federal Courts and nearly every state in the Union is to understand electronically stored information.  Lawyers must be aware of requesting cell phone photos after a car accident; Lawyers must be aware of how to review ESI with litigation review software; and lawyers must know how to effectively communicate litigation holds to their clients and be able to intelligently discuss ESI with their opponents and the Courts.

These challenges are not insurmountable, but will require an active effort to learn about forms of production, work with trusted vendors and educate their judges on their clients’ electronically stored information. 

A Big Thank You

I look forward to my next 100 blog postings and appreciate everyone following me on Twitter, Gabe’s Guide, The Posse List and Complexd.

An Interesting Order…No Twitter in Court

Cameras in Courtrooms have been the cannon fodder for courtroom sketches for years.  A recent court order for a trial in Florida highlights how judges are keenly aware of technology and reporters.

Courtroom

 A temporary press room was set up for reporters covering a criminal trial.  The reporters would be allowed to bring their “cellular phones, Blackberries, iPhones, Palm Pilots, and other similar electronic devices, as long as they agree in writing to not email, text message, twitter, type or otherwise use those devices inside any courtrooms within this District.” United States v. UBS AG, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67270, 3-4 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2009), (emphases added).

The short and simple message of this order is very clear: Judges are savvy to technology, Web 2.0 journalism and are including these portable ESI generating machines into their orders for the press.  I also would bet good money judges are including similar instructions to jurors.

Juror Misconduct: When the Judge Says Don’t Talk About the Case, that Includes Facebook & Twitter

Who knew 140 characters, a few status messages, and tags could play a big role in a court opinion hitting juror misconduct? 

It is not a huge surprise in a criminal case involving politics, money and fraud. 

A Little Background: The Criminal Case against the Defendants

Senate FraudMultiple Defendants were charged with 141 counts of the following:

(1) Fraud and conspiracy to defraud the Pennsylvania Senate;

(2) Fraud and conspiracy to defraud Citizens Alliance for Better Neighborhoods (“Citizens Alliance”);

(3) Conspiracy to defraud the United States Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”);

(4) Fraud related to the Independence Seaport Museum (“ISM”); and

(5) Obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice. United States v. Fumo, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51581 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009)

To keep things interesting, one Defendant was a Pennsylvania State Senator.

The “Honorable” Senator was found guilty of 137 of the 139 charges against him.

Don’t Tweet the Trial

SilencedThe Defendants claimed they were entitled to a new trial because one juror had Facebook status messages and Twitter “Tweets” during the trial.  Fumo, 184-185. 

Here is the short version of what happened:

One of the jurors worked in the HR department of a law firm.  Fumo,192. He also was a user of Facebook, Twitter and had a personal blog. 

Like many Web 2.0 savvy users, he would post status messages and “Tweets” about his day. These included messages about the trial, provided you knew what the juror was talking about, since he did not disclose any facts. 

Jury deliberations were under full steam…and a TV story ran on the trial on March 15, 2009.  Fumo,183-184.

The Defendants learned from the news report that one juror made online postings about the trial.  The Juror also saw the headline for the report and quickly deleted his Facebook and Twitter postings out of fear.  Fumo,183-184. 

The Defendants in turn immediately filed a motion alerting the Court to disqualify the juror.  Fumo,184. 

Just What Did the Juror Say?

Twitter Postings

The juror’s one Twitter posting was simply: “This is it … no looking back now!” Fumo, 193-194. 

Facebook Postings

gossip girlBelow is the Court’s summary of the Facebook Status Messages:

Sept. 18, 2008 (apparently upon continuance of trial judge due to judge’s illness): “… is glad he got a 5 week reprieve, but could use the money …”

Jan. 11, 2009 (apparently referring to the end of the government’s case): “… is wondering if this could be the week to end Part 1?”

Jan. 21, 2009: “…wonders if today will really be the end of Part 1???”

Mar. 4, 2009 (conclusion of closing arguments): “…can’t believe tomorrow may actually be the end!!!!”

Mar. 8, 2009 (Sunday evening before second day of deliberations): “…is not sure about tomorrow …”

Mar. 9, 2009 (end of second day of deliberations): “…says today was much better than expected and tomorrow looks promising too!”

Mar. 13, 2009 (Friday after completion of week of deliberations): “Stay tuned for the big announcement on Monday everyone”

 Fumo, 194-196.

No RT’s from the Defendants

Defense Counsel wanted the juror ”removed” from the trial, to borrow Twitter language.  They claimed the juror’s “behavior and his ‘utterly incredible testimony’ undermined his impartiality as juror.” Fumo,186-187.

The Court Tagging the Juror’s Comments

The Court held an in camera review one day after the news report.  Fumo,185. 

The Court was extremely supportive of the juror’s integrity and stated the following:

I just – - honestly, want to make sure my thoughts are on the record about this guy. My take on him is entirely different. My take on him is this is one conscientious guy trying very much to comply with all the rules and regulations that I’ve established more so then I would ever imagine that a juror would do. And I think that, you know, I’ve heard him and I don’t have any trouble with keeping him on the jury. Fumo, 185-186

The Court & Web 2.0

To the Court’s credit, the Judge included the “About” pages for both Facebook and Twitter.  Footnote 27 nicely summarizes Facebook’s Mission Statement “to give people the power to share and make the world more open and connected.”  Fumo, 184, fn 27. Additionally, the Court summarized Twitter as “a real-time short messaging service that works over multiple networks and devices.”  Fumo, 185, fn 27.

The Court’s RT on “This is it … no looking back now!”

The Court found that the juror’s ONE Tweet suggested “the jury’s decision had been made and that it was too late to influence him.”  Fumo, 194.  Moreover, the message was “so vague as to be unclear.” Fumo, 194.

The Tweet had no details on the case facts or showed any favor/disfavor to anyone in the criminal trial.  Fumo, 194.

Facebook Settings & Status Messages

Fumo-Court's TagThe Court’s analysis of the Facebook Status Messages included reviewing the juror’s privacy settings.  The juror belonged to the 600,000 member Philadelphia network.  Anyone in this network could view his status messages.  Fumo, 195. 

The juror’s profile was configured so only “friends” could post comments on his profile.  “Friends” could either post messages on the juror’s “Wall” or send a Facebook Message.  Fumo, 195-196. 

Defense Counsel questioned the juror on for whose benefit he was writing his status messages.  The juror explained that his postings were:

“…more for my benefit to just get it out of my head, similar to a blog posting or somebody journaling something. It’s just to get it out there. And that’s what a lot of Facebook … it’s just to get — a way to electronically gets thoughts off your mind.”  Fumo, 196.

The Juror was questioned on whether any “non-friends” ever contacted him or did anything to influence his thinking on the case.  The juror answered:

“No. Because – - again, because they have to be someone that I befriended in order to be able to post on the wall. Whether or not they can see it, I’m not sure. But I know they can’t post on it without being one of my friends.” Fumo, 198-199.

The questioning of the juror was very extensive.  Mark Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, would have been very proud of the juror’s explanation of Facebook’s appeal during the Defense questioning.  The juror described that “some people use [Facebook] for connection between other people. I use it, personally, as a way to journal my thoughts and get everything out.” Fumo, 199-200.

The Court’s Findings

The Court found no evidence that the juror was influenced by his Facebook postings.  There was no evidence “random individuals” contacting him.  Moreover, there was no evidence the juror’s “opaque” postings were detailed enough for members of the Philadelphia network to know what the juror was talking about. Fumo, 201.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Given the number of iPhone, BlackBerry and other smart phone users who can be in a potential jury, lawyers and judges should include “No Twitter, Facebook or social networking” in the jury instructions.

Dodging a Mistrial for Juror Misconduct

No Comment...jury misconductIn an age where reporters are Tweeting from Courthouses and Citizen Paparazzi (Snaparazzi) roam the streets with iPhones, one can imagine a slip of the tongue resulting in juror misconduct. 

In the nightmare case of an elderly defendant who drove through a farmers’ market, the question of juror misconduct surfaced via a reporter’s blog.  People v. Weller, 2009 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4685, 44-45 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2009).

A reporter on her post-verdict blog stated that one juror sought spiritual counseling from his minister during a recess from deliberations.  Weller, 44.  

The Problem: A juror cannot discuss a pending trial with a nonjuror.  Weller, 44.

The only evidence offered to show any juror misconduct was the blog.

The blog was insufficient to show any misconduct, because there was no evidence that the juror discussed the case with his minister.  Weller, 44. 

Dodging Juror MisconductThings could have gotten exciting (on an evidentiary level) if the juror had been questioned on what he talked to his minister about, which could have resulted with the juror claiming the clergy- penitent privilege.

This privilege gives the penitent the right to refuse to disclose a penitential communication.  Cal Evid Code § 1033. 

One can wonder if the Defense could compel disclosure to show juror misconduct by claiming the Defendant’s Constitutional right to a fair trial. My guess would be “no,” because the verdict had already been issued and an appellate court will not be doing any fact finding.

If this had come up during trial, then perhaps the Trial Court would have simply excused the juror to avoid a clergy privilege vs Constitution showdown.

Anyone who has confidences to maintain, be it a juror, or a doctor, or anyone who wants to hold a private conversation, should be very careful with what they say in public. The ability for “citizen journalists” to post information in “real time” on Twitter, Facebook or a blog is a fact of life that can ruin your day.

Surfing for Personal Jurisdiction from Online Activity

The internet has made applying the traditional touchstones for personal jurisdiction challenging. Ever so slowly courts have addressed the personal jurisdiction questions in internet cases, to arrive at a point now where there may not be bright lines to guide us; but there are definitely guidelines emerging.

U.S. District Court Judge Edward J. Lodge, Sky Capital Group, LLC v. Rojas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37132, 11 (D. Idaho Apr. 30, 2009)

May 13th is the anniversary of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), one of the great personal jurisdiction cases, followed by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) and Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  It is only appropriate to write about personal jurisdiction on the anniversary of this major decision. 

The United States Constitution requires a court to have personal jurisdiction over the parties to decide a case in controversy. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. Perhaps it is just guys in bow ties and Civil Procedure professors, but the intersection of online activity and a Court exercising personal jurisdiction is an exciting area of case law.  The entire concept of where is it fair to sue someone, or where there are minimum contacts from online business, are topics that could make a law student’s head spin. 

It is antithetical to our civil justice system to have people sued as a “result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or on account of the unilateral activity of third parties” due to blogging, Facebook or people simply maintaining a website.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (U.S. 1985).  Courts have been crafting personal jurisdiction requirements for online contracts and torts for a decade.  The following is one of those cases. 

Truck Stops & Economic Torts

iStock_000005764466XSmallSky Capital Group, LLC v. Rojas, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37132 (D. Idaho Apr. 30, 2009) is a story of alleged trade secret violations by out-of-state Defendants intentionally accessing the Plaintiffs computer servers. Sky Capital Group, 12.

Sky Capital Group, LLC (dba Roady’s Truck Stops), an Idaho limited liability company, employed the two Defendants after a business acquisition. One Defendant was based in Florida and the other in Wisconsin. 

Roady’s sued the Defendants for trade secret violations and economic torts by unlawfully accessing Roady’s administrative and email servers located in Idaho after their employment ended.

Roady’s sued the Defendants in Idaho and the Defendants sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Short Overview of Personal Jurisdiction Rules

The 9th Circuit requires a three part test to exercise specific personal jurisdiction:

(A) The nonresident defendant must purposefully conduct activities within the forum;

(B) The claim must arise or result from forum-related activities; and

(C) The exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Sky Capital Group, 6, citing Doe, 248 F.3d at 923.

Knowledge that the plaintiffs are in a specific state is not enough for a court to exercise jurisdiction.  Courts require “something more” to show a defendant directed their actions to a specific state.  Sky Capital Group, 11.

The Court found that the Defendants accessing the Plaintiffs’ servers was the “something more” the Court needed to exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. 

Intention Acts: Accessing Servers

The “intentional actions” of accessing the Plaintiffs’ computer serves included logging onto the system, and accessing proprietary information including, “recorded customer lists, vendor lists, pricing information, marketing information and other valuable customer and company information.”  Sky Capital Group, 12.  Such directed activity in accessing the computer systems was such that the Defendants “should have reasonably anticipated being sued in Idaho.”  Sky Capital Group, 13. 

Expressly Aimed at Idaho

iStock_000000542490XSmallThe “expressly aimed” requirement is defined as “when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.” Sky Capital Group, 14, citing Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This rule also requires “something more” besides an action having a foreseeable effect in a forum state for personal jurisdiction.  Sky Capital Group, 14. 

The defendant had to knowing a plaintiff is a resident of “the forum state and that the harm resulting from the intentional act will be suffered in the forum state.” Sky Capital Group, 14-15. 

The fact the out-of-state Defendants knew Roady’s was located in Idaho, coupled with the allegation of taking proprietary business information to compete directly with the Roady’s, was a sufficient showing to meet the expressly aimed requirement.  Sky Capital Group, 15.

Causing Harm in Idaho

The Court found the “harm in the forum state” also met, based on the fact the Defendants knew the Plaintiff was located in Idaho and their conduct would cause the Plaintiff harm.  Sky Capital Group, 16-17. 

Lessons Learned

Way back when I had Civil Procedure in 1998, the course books had not even touched personal jurisdiction from online activity.  This will become standard analysis as Generation X lawyers become partners and Net Geners become associates.  The volume of online business, Web 2.0 activity, let alone continued advancements of iPhones and BlackBerries, will ensure these issues continue to develop. 

I’d just like to avoid a giant split Supreme Court decision like Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court when the Courts determine bright lines for personal jurisdiction from online activity.

Status Messages and Client Confidences

Web 2.0 marketing is a highly effective way for lawyers to promote their services to prospective clients.  Web 2.0 marketing is leveraging collaborative programs hosted over the Internet, such as social networking sites or Wikis, to provide content highlighting an attorney’s services.  This form of marketing could also result in disaster if used incorrectly. 

Client Confidences: The Work Product Doctrine and the Attorney Client Privilege

tugboatThe sailor in me remembers Hickman v Taylor 329 U.S. 495 (U.S. 1947) because it had a tug boat that sank.  The lawyer in me remembers it for the Work Product Doctrine.

 

For those not familiar with the Work Product Doctrine, the Doctrine protects documents prepared in anticipation of litigation from discovery, including mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or a lawyer’s legal theories.  Chemtech Royalty Assocs., L.P. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27696 (M.D. La. Mar. 30, 2009).  The Work Product Doctrine is codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).  The Doctrine covers material prepared by a party and a party’s representative, which includes lawyers, consultants or agents.  In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41568 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006), citing FRCP 26(b)(3). 

istock_000002813503xsmallThe Attorney Client Privilege is a different concept.  The Attorney Client Privilege protects “confidential disclosures made by a client to an attorney in order to obtain legal advice, as well as an attorney’s advice in response to such disclosures.”  In re CV Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41568 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2006), (citations omitted).  Additionally, the privilege applies “only [to] those disclosures — necessary to obtain informed legal advice — which might not have been made absent the privilege.” Id.

California law also requires a lawyer to, “…maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.”  Cal Bus & Prof Code § 6068

Additionally, attorneys should realize they are responsible for their staff, consultants, non-lawyers, and others also using technology. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.1, Rule 5.2 and Rule 5.3 outline these responsibilities.

Enter Web 2.0 Marketing

There is the potential for disclosure of information protected by both the Work Product Doctrine and the Attorney Client Privilege on social networking sites such as Twitter or Facebook.  These services are popular Web 2.0 sites where users can create public profiles, invite other users to follow their daily updates, micro-blogging and other information sharing.  It does not take much to imagine someone new to Web 2.0 marketing disclosing too much information to their “friends” or “followers.”

Here is how the risk of disclosure is possible: a Facebook user posts a status message they deem harmless, such as “I just landed ‘Company A’ as a client and have a bunch of back-up tapes to restore.”

Does this disclose any mental impressions or strategy about the case?  Probably not, but it is flirting with disclosure.  Moreover, Company A would probably not be thrilled with their lawyer announcing their actions in a lawsuit to 300 “friends.”

After reviewing data from imaged hard drives, the same individual posts the status message, “Wow, they really blew preserving their emails.” 

If the client is somehow identifiable, there is a problem, because a mental impression of the client’s ESI is being disclosed.  While the “friends” are probably in no way related to anyone in a lawsuit, disclosing a client confidence to one person is one too many. 

This Does Not Mean Don’t Market!

This is only a call to action for common sense.  Lawyers, consultants and their agents should exercise reasonable care in promoting their services.  A status message of “Working on a Summary Judgment Motion” or “Preparing for the CMC” or “I settled the case!” is not disclosing any legal theory or confidence.  Moreover, using Facebook with the JDSupa application to show published documents can be very effective marketing.  However, saying a client name, plus a specific argument or confidence in a status message, might put a tech savvy lawyer in hot water. 

Web 2.0 empowers lawyers to promote their services and demonstrate their knowledge in ways few people could imagine when Silicon Valley engineers were teenagers building computers in the 1970s.  Lawyers marketing their services on Facebook, Twitter and other social networking sites should exercise reasonable care to protect client confidences.  While this may seem like stating the obvious, the potential for someone saying too much in a status message is very real.