There is Only One Way to Rock Search Terms

In Re National Association of Music Merchants, Musical Instruments and Equipment Antitrust Litigation involved a dispute over additional searches of electronically stored information using abbreviations and acronyms for previously agreed-upon search terms.

Instead of turning the discovery dial up to 11, the Court pulled the plug on the additional search terms.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145804, 21-24 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2011).

Search Terms: I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For

The Plaintiffs contented that the Defendants needed to run additional searches of their ESI that included abbreviations and acronyms for the previously agreed-upon search terms. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *17.

The Defendants were not cool with the Plaintiffs’ new song request.

If producing discovery was like recording an album, here is the digital booklet overview of the facts:

Before responding to the Plaintiff’s discovery requests, the Defendants asked the Plaintiffs to provide them with search terms.

Plaintiffs argued they could not provide search terms, because the Defendants had not provided them “relevant information.”

After reviewing the Defendants search strings, the Plaintiffs agreed with the Defendants to modify the Defendants search strings to include names to capture “Defendant-to-Defendant” communications.

In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *17-18.

Once the Plaintiffs began their document review after the Defendants produced their ESI, the Plaintiffs learned abbreviations or acronyms were used in the internal communications.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *18.

The Plaintiffs argued the Defendants’ search did not capture the “agreed-upon universe” of ESI because of the failure to include the internal abbreviations or acronyms.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *18-19.

The Plaintiffs requested each Defendant to

(i) Identify abbreviations or acronyms commonly used within the Defendant corporation for any of the agreed-upon search terms, or affirmatively state that no abbreviations or acronyms are commonly used;

(ii) State whether the Defendant included all identified abbreviations and acronyms in its search for responsive documents; and

(iii) If abbreviations and acronyms were identified but not included in Defendant’s search, re-run its search and produce new responsive documents.

In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *19.

Search Terms: Don’t Bring Me Down

The Defendants argued the Plaintiffs ignored a basic fact: the terms already searched were selected and agreed upon because they were the terms most likely to produce responsive documents.   In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *19.

Moreover, the Defendants had already spent a substantial amount of time and money reviewing the prior production in what was supposed to be a limited discovery period.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *19.

Additionally, the new search protocol would require the review of tens of thousands of additional responsive documents. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *20.

Further, the Defendants argued the Plaintiffs had “ample opportunity” to add abbreviations to the search methodology, but did not do so.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *20.

Determining Keywords: With or Without You

The Defendants requested the Plaintiffs to meet and confer over search terms before the searches were run, which the Plaintiffs declined.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *20.  Additionally, the Plaintiffs did not raise any objections or concerns over the Defendants proposed search terms they shared by letter with the Plaintiffs. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *20.

After the Defendants had begun their document review based on their searches, the Plaintiffs contacted each Defendant to expand their search terms, reaching an expanded search agreement with each Defendant. Id.

Judgment Day

The Court cited the search term truism that “effective search terms cannot be identified in an information vacuum and that a party’s ‘human knowledge’ should be utilized to craft keyword searches that are responsive to the “inherent malleability and ambiguity of spoken and written English.” In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *21, citing The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 201, 209 (Fall 2007).

Moreover, “[W]hile key word searching is a recognized method to winnow relevant documents from large repositories, use of this technique must be a cooperative and informed process.” In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *21-22, citing In re Seroquel Products Liability Litigation, 244 F.R.D. 650, 662 (M.D. Fla. 2007).

The Court stated that the “preferable” method to reduce challenges to search terms is a “full and transparent discussion among counsel of the search terminology.”  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *22, citing The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 204 (Fall 2007).

Finally, a Court may limit discovery if a requesting party has had “ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action,” or “if the burden or expense outweighs its likely benefit.” In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *22, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(ii), (iii).

The One That Got Away

The Court held the Plaintiff had “ample opportunity to obtain discovery regarding abbreviations and acronyms” and that the burden and expense of searching the abbreviations/ acronyms outweighed its likely benefit.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *22-23, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(ii), (iii).

The Court noted the Plaintiffs had two opportunities to suggest the Defendants include abbreviations/ acronyms in their searches and did not do so.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *23.  As the Court explained:

In the spirit of the conclusions made at the Sedona Conference, and in light of the transparent discussion among counsel of the search terminology and subsequent agreement on the search method, the Court finds it unreasonable for Defendant to re-search documents they have already searched and produced.

In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *23, citing The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on the Use of Search & Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 Sedona Conf. J. 189, 204 (Fall 2007).

The Court further found ordering a re-search of the Defendants’ ESI was overly burdensome, because the Defendants had met & conferred with the Plaintiff and relied on their agreement over search terms in conducting their search and review for responsive ESI.  In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., at *23-24.

Based on the above, the Court denied the additional searching of the Defendants ESI.

Bow Tie Thoughts

The search for electronically stored information is constantly a hotly debated topic.  Search generally may be conducted at the collection stage for strategic collections, during processing for data reduction and in document review.  Each stage has a slightly different methodology, but all have the same intent: find what is responsive.

The best time to discuss search terms between the parties is during a Rule 26(f) conference.  There is no shame in holding more than Rule 26(f) conference specifically dedicated to search terms between the parties search professionals, in order to ensure the search is as productive as possible.

Search technology is always improving to save time and costs by efficiently finding responsive electronically stored information.  One upcoming product leveraging new search technology is XERA by iConect.  In full disclosure, I recently did a webinar highlighting XERA and search technology.  iConect has also contracted with me for several continuing legal educational events on search technology.

XERA utilizes faceted search, which is a technique for accessing information organized according to a faceted classification system, allowing users to explore a collection of information by applying multiple filters. Wikipedia, Faceted search, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Faceted_search.

Anyone who has done online shopping or booked airline travel has used faceted search technology.  XERA will use faceted search to improve the search and review of electronically stored information.

For more on XERA, please visit http://www.iconect.com/xera/

“Any Party’s” Claims or Defenses

Nothing says Christmas like an opinion by Judge Facciola.

Jenkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., is litigation over a train crash between two Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority trains.  Jenkins v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146065 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2011).

Like almost all litigation, the discovery dispute must have felt like a train wreck to the parties.

The discovery dispute can be summarized as follows: one subcontractor Defendant (hereinafter the Moving Party) brought a sanctions motion against another Defendant (Opposing Party), claiming they were prejudiced by the Opposing Party’s failure to produce certain information supporting the Moving Party’s defenses.  Jenkins, at *23-24.

The Moving Party also brought a motion for summary judgment, based on the sovereign immunity afforded the Opposing Party because it was Opposing Party’s contractor. Jenkins, at *15.

In its initial disclosures, the Moving Party identified witnesses from the Opposing Party and documents that supported the Moving Party’s defenses.  Jenkins, at *15-16.

The Opposing Party produced eight witnesses, allowed a site inspection of the Operations Control Center and produced 3,348,483 pages of electronically stored information.  Jenkins, at *16. The Opposing Party produced 2,476,363 pages.  Both productions were reviewed in a litigation support software.  Id.

Additional discovery from custodians was later produced, including depositions and over 4,000 documents.  Jenkins, at *17.

The co-Defendants shared an e-Discovery service provider.  The Opposing Party represented that “it was not asked and therefore did not provide the names of the “custodians” of the produced discovery since it believed that [the Moving Party] had equal access to the names” of the custodians. Jenkins, at *14.

The Moving Party argued the late production prejudiced them, because if it “had the documents sooner it could have done additional follow up discovery during the discovery period and then used the documents produced and perhaps other information developed therefrom in the motion for summary judgment it has now filed.”  Jenkins, at *18, citing the Moving Party’s Reply to the Opposition to the Motion for Sanctions.

Judge Facciola quickly, and with candid relief, stated at the beginning of his analysis:

There being no evidence of any loss of data, the complicated principles pertaining to preservation and spoliation do not, thankfully, have to be considered.

Jenkins, at *19.

The Moving Party claimed sanctions were appropriate because the Opposing Party did not comply with its initial disclosure obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a) by producing information related to the government contractor defense.  Jenkins, at *19.

The Opposing Party countered that they were not going to assert the government contractor defense, thus they had no duty to produce information related to that defense.  Jenkins, at *19.

The Moving Party argued in a footnote that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the production of requested documents that are relevant to “any party’s claim or defense,” not just those claims or defenses that pertain specifically to the producing party. Jenkins, at *20, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

The Court quickly zeroed in on the difference between initial disclosures under Rule 26(a) verse the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1).  Jenkins, at *20.  The Court noted that the Moving Party’s view of initial disclosures would amend Rule 26(a) as follows:

(A)           . . . [A] party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties:

(i)                      the name . . . of each individual likely to have discoverable information-along with the subjects of that information-that any party may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

(ii)                     a copy-or a description by category and location-of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that any party . . . may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment;

As the Court noted, changing “disclosing party” to “any party” would “impose an extraordinary new obligation on the parties to a lawsuit…” Jenkins, at *21. The Court rejected this construction of Rule 26(a).

The Court found there was no sanction available under Rule 26(a).  Jenkins, at *21.  Further, there was no violation of a discovery order by the Opposing Party or any clear and convincing evidence of bad faith. Jenkins, at *22.  Accordingly, the Court denied the Moving Party’s motion for sanctions. Jenkins, at *23.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Initial Disclosures require a party to identify all electronically stored information within its possession, custody or control to support any of its claims or defenses in a lawsuit.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).  Additionally, a party must make their Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures based on information “reasonably available to it.” Moreover, the failure to identify ESI that supports a claim or defense can result in the discovery being excluded from a case.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

The prospect that initial disclosures could be read to apply to “any party” instead of the “disclosing party” is a sobering thought.  It would tear apart the entire concept of requesting discovery like wrapping paper if a party had to disclose “any party’s” claims or defenses.

There are many benefits to informal discovery between parties and agreeing to production during a meet & confer. Moreover, there is an attorney’s overall duty of candor to the court to avoid making false arguments based on the information within one’s control.  However, the prospect that a party need to review and disclose the ESI in its control that supports another party’s claims or defenses would add a new burden on litigants.

Misadventures in Searching Unallocated Space

The parties in I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, Inc., stipulated to the search of the Plaintiff’s computer system by the Defendants’ forensic expert.  I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141614 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011).

The expert ran a combination of approximately 60 keywords, including French words, keywords expanded as wildcards and Boolean connectors, across all of the data on the computer system.  This included unallocated space.  The search was not targeted to specific custodians, relevant time periods or active files.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *5-6.

Examples of the search terms included:

back order*

product*

profit*

HS*

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *5-6.

In the words of the Court:

The results should come as no surprise. The broad search terms hit millions of times across the large data set. In the unallocated space alone, the terms generated 64,382,929 hits. These hits represent an estimated 95 million pages of data.

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *6.

The opinion does not discuss whether any de-duplication, near-de-duplication, de-NISTing or other data reduction methodologies were applied to the keyword “hits.”

The Court expressed its concern in a footnote over the parties referring to keyword “hits” as separate documents.

As the Court explained:

Given the volume of hits and search terms used, this is essentially impossible—statistically speaking terms like “profit,” “loss,” “revenue,” and “profit” frequently occur together, and it stands to reason that at least some files mentioning product lines would make reference to more than one at the same time. Consequently, the Court is left to wonder whether the total hit and estimated page numbers are genuinely correct.

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *7, fn 4.

The Plaintiff was not thrilled at the idea of conducting a privilege review of the large data set.  The Magistrate Court agreed, issuing an order: 1) Allowing the Plaintiffs to withhold ESI from the unallocated space and 2) Permitting the Defendants to seek reimbursement for their search from the Plaintiff.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *7.

The Magistrate Judge also found:

1) Good cause existed to modify the original discovery order, because the burden on the Plaintiffs would “outweigh any potential benefit that may result.”

2) Defendants had not met its burden of demonstrating the complete relevancy of the ESI they sought, including that the Defendant had not identified any ESI destroyed by the Plaintiff. 

3) The overbroad search terms made the likelihood of finding relevant information that would be admissible at trial “minimal.”

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *7-8.

The Defendants appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order.  The District Court affirmed.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *8, 18.

The Defendants had the difficult task of demonstrating the Magistrate Judge’s order was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” I-Med Pharma Inc., at *8.

The District Court described the Magistrate Judge’s order as “reasonable exercise of…discretion in managing the scope of permissible discovery.” I-Med Pharma Inc., at *11.

The Defendants argued the Magistrate Judge applied the wrong standard to granting the relief from the original stipulation.  The Defendants argued “exceptional circumstances” were required to grant relief from the stipulation, citing a case involving a stipulation on liability.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *11-12.

The Court explained that the scope of discovery is very different than a party attempting to withdraw an admission of wrongdoing post-trial.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *13.

As the Court stated:

During discovery, the parties are still actively uncovering the evidence needed to bring a case to trial and have ample opportunity to modify and adjust their litigation strategy to any important developments. Clearly a court has the power to modify stipulations concerning discovery terms and deadlines while discovery is still ongoing without the showing of manifest injustice. A court could not effectively perform its duty to fairly and efficiently manage discovery if every minor change to a stipulated briefing schedule or deposition date required a showing of “exceptional circumstances” or “substantial and real harm.” While courts should not casually discard agreements between the parties, nor should they abrogate their duty to balance both burden and the likelihood of uncovering relevant evidence merely because a party made an improvident agreement.

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *13-14.

Even if the “clearly erroneous” standard applied, attorneys reviewing potentially 65 million “hits” (or 95 million pages of data) for privilege would be very expensive.  I-Med Pharma Inc., at *14-15.

The Court also rejected the Defense argument that privilege review could be limited by simply searching for the word “privileged.”  The Court explained the problems with such a search:

Even when dealing with intact files, potentially privileged information may often be found in emails, memoranda, presentations, or other documents that are not explicitly flagged as privileged or confidential. And since the data searched here is likely to contain fragmented or otherwise incomplete documents, it is entirely possible for privileged material to be found without its original identifying information.

The Court upheld the Magistrate Judge’s order, closing the opinion with a cautionary message on search terms:

While Plaintiff should have known better than to agree to the search terms used here, the interests of justice and basic fairness are little served by forcing Plaintiff to undertake an enormously expensive privilege review of material that is unlikely to contain non-duplicative evidence.

I-Med Pharma Inc., at *17-18.

Bow Tie Thoughts

Parties get into trouble with search terms all the time. Moreover, a party may agree to a search methodology that they later regret. This can happen in multiple stages of discovery, whether it is collection, early case assessment, processing or discovery review.  Each stage involves using “search” technologies, but a search string used in a review platform to find ESI for a deposition might be too narrow at the collection stage.

While the facts of case will control whether unallocated space needs to be searched, the prospect of conducting a privilege review of millions of files the “old fashion way” is mind numbing.  It would be like trying to find a needle in a swimming pool of needles.

If extremely large data sets need to be reviewed, mechanical analytics is one way to expedite review and control discovery costs.  There are multiple products on the market with “predictive coding” abilities that learn from reviewers which ESI that is responsive, thus “machine coding” the files as “relevant” or “privileged.”

The effectiveness of this technology will turn heavily on who does the initial review, whether it is a combination of attorneys who understand the subject matter of a case; information from the parties on how they communicated and the language used in the case; types of relevant ESI; search terms or concepts agreed to by the parties in a meet and confer; plus a host of other factors.

I am sure there are eDiscovery attorneys and Magistrate Judges eagerly awaiting the right case were this technology has been properly used; the methodology documented; and declarations from the software developers explaining the science of the algorithms.  When that day happens, one judge can issue an opinion validating the use of mechanical analytics in identifying responsive electronically stored information. 

Attorneys will always be needed to decide what ESI to use in a deposition or trial, because a human being is better at determining what will convince other human beings the “truth” of a case.  However, technology can make finding what is relevant out of a data set with 65 million records far more effective than a brute force review of each record.

Please vote for Bow Tie Law in the ABA Journal Blawg 100in the IP Law category.

Cross Spoliation Claims for Lost Video & Witness Statements

In Patel v. Havana Bar, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139180  (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2011), both parties were accused of spoliation. The underlining facts involved the Plaintiff attending an engagement party at the Defendant’s restaurant/bar and falling off a two-story balcony.

Defendants’ Spoliation

The allegations against the Defendant involved the preservation of security video.  The Defendants had three weeks to preserve the video, but were unable to copy or transfer the video off the security camera system. Patel, at *14-15.

The Defendants argued their video system was unable to copy video to a CD or DVD.  Moreover, they explained they contacted a video system service provider to help transfer the video.  However, despite these efforts, the video was recorded over after three weeks.  Patel, at *15-16.

The Court found the failure to preserve the video was spoliation, finding that because of the accident, a lawsuit was “reasonably likely,” thus triggering the duty to preserve the video evidence.  Patel, at *16.

The Court issued an adverse inference instruction for the loss of the video evidence.  Patel, at *25.  

An adverse inference instruction is ordered under the following circumstances:

(1) The evidence in question was within the party’s control;

(2) There appears to have been actual suppression or withholding of the evidence;

(3) The evidence in question was relevant to the claims or defenses; and

(4) It was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would be discoverable in litigation.

Patel, at *26, citing Mosaid Techs. Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (D.N.J. 2004).

Case law does not require the destruction to be intentional, stating “negligent destruction of relevant evidence can be sufficient to give rise to the spoliation inference.” Patel, at *26, citing Mosaid Techs. Inc., v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D.N.J. 2004).

The Court held the following against the Defendants:

Here, the spoliation inference is appropriate because the video footage was within Havana’s exclusive control; the video was not preserved before its destruction because Defendants failed to follow through with the steps necessary to ensure preservation; the footage of the bar and the area in which Plaintiff fell on the night of the incident is clearly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims; and Defendants knew or should have known that the footage would later be discoverable given their knowledge of Plaintiff’s injuries and the likelihood of suit. Defendants will of course be permitted to explain to the jury the steps they did take to preserve the footage.

Patel, at *26.

Plaintiffs’ Spoliation

The spoliation claim against the Plaintiff involved his sister-in-law sending two messages on Facebook in 2008 and 2010 for witness statements from party attendees.  The Defendants did not learn about these witness statements until the deposition of one of the party attendees.  Patel, at *16-18.

The Defendants claimed the Plaintiffs “spoon-fed friendly witnesses testimony that would support their case theories, and then lost or destroyed evidence that would not support their current case theory.” Patel, at *17.

The Plaintiffs claimed the witness statements collected by the sister-in-law were protected from disclosure under the work product doctrine.  Patel, at *17.

The Court stated in a footnote about the work product argument:  “We are at a loss to understand how statements provided by non-party individuals could constitute “attorney-client” material.”  Patel, at *21, footnote 4.

The Court held the loss of the 2008 witness statements were “clearly spoliation.”  Patel, at *17.  The Court explained the Plaintiff or his family had the statements in their possession and thus had a duty to preserve them. Patel, at *18.

As the Court explained:

Even if the work product privilege did somehow come into play, this privilege was belatedly raised, and documents were withheld without ever notifying Defense counsel. This type of discovery practice is directly contrary to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5), which requires a party who withholds information based on a claim of privilege to expressly raise that privilege and describe the nature of the withheld documents in a privilege log.

Patel, at *18.

The Court also found the failure to disclose the witness statements violated the Plaintiffs’ initial disclosure obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(a).  Patel, at *22.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A), parties must disclosure individuals and information that supports their claims or defenses.  Patel, at *19.  This is to make discovery more effective and prohibit gamesmanship of a party not producing relevant information on the grounds the opposing party did not specifically request the information. Patel, at *19-20.

As the Court explained on the failure to produce the witness statements:

Put more directly, this is the type of “basic, substantive evidence” that should have been produced “without resort to the complications, inefficiency, and litigiousness of discovery practice.” [citation omitted]. Plaintiff should have known that the witness statements would eventually be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(3)(A), and that producing the statements piecemeal was not in any way designed to foster the fair and efficient exchange of information.

Patel, at *23.

The Court ordered an adverse inference instruction for the loss of the witness statements.  Patel, at *29.  After finding all four spoliation factors met, the Court stated:

We believe the best way to sort out Plaintiff’s discovery misconduct is to allow the jury to draw its own conclusions as to the evidentiary value of how the evidence was handled.

Patel, at *29-30.

The Court further ordered the re-deposition of five of the Plaintiff witnesses, at the cost of the Plaintiff.  Patel, at *30.

The Court also awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for the time spent to acquire discovery they were rightfully entitled to.  Patel, at *30.  The Court stated the Defendants’ itemization of $20,000 looked reasonable, but would not set a specific award until the Plaintiffs could respond to the itemization.  Patel, at *30-31.

Bow Tie Thoughts

This case is a strong reminder, with adverse inference instructions against both parties, about the importance of preservation.

The preservation of evidence is a challenge for litigants of every type, from private individuals to large companies.  Identifying ESI for preservation can often having many moving parts, frequently resembling a high-speed fan.

It is no secret from case law that electronically stored information can easily be lost.  Preserving relevant data requires having individuals trained in data collection preserve ESI after a triggering event has occurred.  While there are many ways to collect data, such as mirror images, targeted collections or remote methodologies, it is vital to engage a collection expert early to ensure relevant ESI is not lost.

Social media is only expanding where there might be responsive electronically stored information in a lawsuit.  In this case, two Facebook messages seeking witness statements were key exhibits into the spoliation claims.  There are many other examples.

This case is also a reminder that attorneys should add inquiries about social media to their discovery plans.  While social media will not be present in every case, it is an excellent topic for client interviews and Rule 26(f) conferences.

BOW TIE LAW CHOSEN AS ONE OF THE ABA JOURNAL’S BLAWG 100

I am greatly honored that Bow Tie Law has been selected by the editors of the ABA Journal as one of THE ABA JOURNAL’S BLAWG 100. 
I want to thank everyone who nominated Bow Tie Law for this great recognition. I am very humbled by the ABA’s kind words describing my blog:

We value Joshua Gilliland’s Bow Tie Law blog—an exhaustive look at e-discovery issues—for being on the cutting edge of evidentiary news, and for explaining the nuts and bolts in a clear and concise manner. This attorney from Santa Clara, Calif., is also quite the snazzy dresser.

I started this blog to analyze eDiscovery cases and highlight solutions in reviewing ESI. I hope I have helped attorneys understand some of the “knotty” issues of electronically stored information. Again, thank you for this honor.

I will also continue to do my best to promote the maxim, “Bow Ties Are Cool.”

The ABA Journal is now asking readers to vote on their favorite Blawgs in each of the 5th Annual Blawg 100’s 12 categories. Please go to http://www.abajournal.com/blawg100 to register and vote. Voting ends at close of business on Dec. 30, 2011. Bow Tie Law is in the IP Law category.